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Gerrymandering & Justiciability: The Political Question 
Doctrine After Rucho v. Common Cause 
G. MICHAEL PARSONS 
In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court held that partisan-gerrymandering 
claims present political questions beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The 
decision marks the first time that a majority of the Court has used the political 
question doctrine to dismiss a claim based on the supposed unmanageability of legal 
standards alone. Despite this development being essential to the Court’s holding, its 
significance went largely unexplored and uncontested. 
This Article deconstructs Rucho’s articulation and application of the political 
question doctrine and makes two contributions. 
First, the Article disentangles the political question doctrine from neighboring 
justiciability doctrines. The result is a set of substantive principles that should guide 
federal courts as they exercise a range of routine judicial functions—remedial, 
adjudicative, and interpretive. Rather than unrealistically attempting to draw crisp 
jurisdictional boundaries between exercises of “political” and “judicial” power, the 
political question doctrine should seek to moderate their inevitable (and frequent) 
clash. Standing doctrine should continue to guide courts in determining whether they 
have authority over a case involving a political question. But the political question 
doctrine should guide courts in determining how to navigate areas of overlapping 
constitutional authority covered by the question. 
Second, the Article challenges the assumption that manageability can and should 
provide a standalone test of jurisdiction. Rucho’s “manageability exception” to 
Article III actively undermines the separation of powers principles it purports to 
protect. Treating manageability as an independent test of jurisdiction invites federal 
courts to opine about abstract questions not presented by the case or controversy 
before them and to abdicate their duty to decide cases properly before them without 
any constitutional command to the contrary. Rucho offers a profound illustration. 
Chief Justice Roberts asserts that partisan-gerrymandering claims are not 
“resolvable according to legal principles,” but his opinion fails to set out any legal 
standard rooted in the Constitution for deciding when a claim is or is not 
“manageable.” The result is a decision as hollow as it is hypocritical. 
 This Article proposes a new approach to the political question doctrine, explains 
where the Court went wrong in Rucho, and explores what it could mean for the future 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court held that “[p]artisan gerrymandering 
claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”1 Scholarly 
commentary surrounding the decision focused (understandably) on the consequences 
for redistricting law writ large and the implications for partisan-gerrymandering 
claims in state courts.2 Overlooked in all the commotion, however, is what Rucho 
means for the political question doctrine itself.  
 
 
 1. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2485, 2506–07 (2019). 
 2. See, e.g., Joey Fishkin, Rucho: A Sinkhole Dangerously Close to the House, ELECTION 
L. BLOG (July 1, 2019, 7:38 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=105928 [https://perma.cc/CP 
Q3-MUM8]; Keith Gaddie, After Rucho: Fifty Thickets, ELECTION L. BLOG (July 3, 2019, 7:00 
AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=105918 [https://perma.cc/7TVS-A6ZL]; Rebecca Green, 
A Spade Is a Spade, ELECTION L. BLOG (July 5, 2019, 7:00 AM), http://electionlawblog.org 
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The modern political question doctrine3 was born in Baker v. Carr alongside the 
justiciability of the individual vote-dilution claim.4 The doctrine purports to establish 
a “narrow exception” to the Supreme Court’s duty under Article III “to decide cases 
properly before it, even those it ‘would gladly avoid.’”5 When a case involves “a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate 
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it,” the Court is said to lack the authority to decide the dispute.6 
 Never in its history, however, had the Court withheld jurisdiction over a case 
based on the supposed “unmanageability” of legal standards alone.7 That is until 
Rucho.8 Given this new development, one might imagine a robust debate unfolding 
between the majority and dissenting opinions over the meaning, shape, and scope of 
the doctrine. Instead, the Justices simply assumed that manageability constitutes an 
independent test of jurisdiction and debated its application to the case before them.9 
The Rucho majority’s decision to turn away political-gerrymandering claims was 
deeply disappointing, but the Court’s unanimous, uncritical acceptance and 
extension of the modern political question doctrine in Rucho was unfortunate in its 
own right. The doctrine (if it can even be called that) is little more than an amalgam 
of tangentially related concepts and cases—a repository of loose odds and ends.10 
Rucho represents a missed opportunity to bring clarity to political-gerrymandering 
and political question case law. 
In this Article, I deconstruct Rucho’s articulation and application of the modern 
political question doctrine and propose a new approach. The Article makes two 
primary contributions.  
First, it disentangles those aspects of the political question doctrine that do unique 
doctrinal work from those aspects that are merely borrowed from neighboring 
separation of powers principles. Doing so demonstrates how the purposes of the 
political question doctrine would be better served by (a) letting adjacent legal 
doctrines exclusively fulfill some of the aims currently ascribed to the political 
 
 
/?p=106 071 [https://perma.cc/MBG8-8EHF]. 
 3. I use the term “modern political question doctrine” throughout to refer to the doctrine 
that the Supreme Court currently employs. This can be distinguished from the “traditional 
political question doctrine” that appears in the Court’s pre-Baker political question cases. See 
Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1908 (2015); John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 460–
68 (2017); infra Section III.B. 
 4. 369 U.S. 186, 208–37 (1962). 
 5. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189, 194–95 (2012) (quoting Cohens 
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)). 
 6. Id. at 195 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)). 
 7. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509, 2515 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 8. See id. 
 9. See generally id. 
 10. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 244 (2002). 
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question doctrine,11 and (b) imposing distinct substantive (rather than jurisdictional) 
obligations on the judiciary depending on the type of judicial power involved.12  
This is not to say that “political questions” do not exist—they do. As Professor 
John Harrison observes, “political questions” arise when “one component of the 
government is called on to perform a function more associated with the other.”13 But 
different judicial functions raise distinct political questions.14 And the appropriate 
doctrinal response depends on the type of question asked: remedial, adjudicative, or 
interpretive.  
 None of these political questions, however, justify a categorical exception to the 
federal courts’ jurisdiction over cases or controversies otherwise properly before 
them.15 Standing doctrine should guide courts in determining whether they have 
authority over a case involving a political question.16 The political question doctrine, 
on the other hand, should guide courts in determining how to navigate the area of 
overlapping constitutional authority covered by the question.17 Rather than 
unrealistically attempting to draw a crisp jurisdictional boundary between exercises 
of “political” and “judicial” power, the doctrine should seek to moderate their 
inevitable clash. 
Second, I argue that the stand-alone “manageability” exception to Article III 
jurisdiction found in Rucho actively undermines the separation of powers principles 
it purports to protect. Conditioning jurisdiction on manageability alone invites 
federal courts to opine about abstract questions not presented by the case or 
controversy before them (e.g., is this constitutional right inherently unsusceptible to 
legal standards?)18 and to abdicate their duty to decide cases properly before them 
without any clear constitutional instruction to the contrary.19  
In Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts asserts that partisan-gerrymandering claims are 
an exception because they are not “resolvable according to legal principles” and that 
the Court lacks jurisdiction “in the absence of a constitutional directive or legal 
standards to guide [the Court] in the exercise of [its] authority.”20 But that accusation 
is as empty as it is ironic. For while the dissent sets out plain First Amendment and 
equal protection standards for adjudicating partisan-gerrymandering claims, the 
majority fails to articulate any clear constitutional directive or distinct legal standard 
for deciding when a claim is or is not “manageable” under the political question 
doctrine.21  
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the modern political question 
doctrine, its departure from the principles that animated Baker v. Carr, and its 
 
 
 11. See infra Sections II.A, II.B, III.A. 
 12. See infra Sections II.C, III.B. 
 13. Harrison, supra note 3, at 505. 
 14. See infra Sections II.C, III.B. 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. See infra Sections II.A, III.A. 
 17. See infra Sections II.C, III.B. 
 18. See infra Section III.A. 
 19. See infra Section IV.A. 
 20. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494, 2508 (2019) (emphasis in original). 
 21. See infra Part IV. Compare Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2516–17 (Kagan, J., dissenting), with 
id. at 2493–94 (majority opinion).  
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increasingly untenable place within the Supreme Court’s broader Article III 
jurisprudence.  
Parts II, III, and IV each address a distinct aspect of judicial power and examine 
the political questions that arise with each exercise of power: remedial, adjudicative, 
and interpretive. Each Part untangles the role of adjacent doctrines, proposes how 
federal courts should respond to each type of political question, and explores what 
those doctrines might look like in practice. The Court’s political-gerrymandering 
cases provide a critical lens along the way for exploring the purposes and contours 
of each doctrine. 
I. THE MODERN POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
The modern political question doctrine purports to stand for the proposition that 
there are certain categories of constitutional claims that the federal courts are wholly 
without jurisdiction to adjudicate because one (or more) factors render the issue to 
be resolved a “political question.”22 On this reading, courts lack jurisdiction under 
Article III when a claim involves:  
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.23 
These six factors were first assembled in Baker v. Carr, where Justice Brennan 
catalogued the Court’s prior political question cases in an attempt to identify their 
common attributes.24 
At the time, however, the factors that Justice Brennan compiled were descriptive 
more than anything else—a survey to distinguish the Court’s political question cases 
and demonstrate that the vote-dilution claim before the Court had all the trappings of 
a normal adjudicable dispute.25 Justice Brennan recognizes the “nonjusticiability” of 
 
 
 22. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494; Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 194–95 (2012); Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Sometimes, . . . the judicial 
department has no business entertaining [a] claim of unlawfulness—because the question is 
entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no judicially enforceable rights. Such 
questions are said to be ‘nonjusticiable,’ or ‘political questions.’” (citations omitted)); 13C 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3534 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER] (“[P]olitical-question 
doctrine purports to establish that a particular question is beyond judicial competence, no 
matter who raises it, how immediate the interests affected, or how burning the controversy.”). 
 23. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 24. Id. at 210. 
 25. See id. at 208–37. 
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political questions as “primarily a function of the separation of powers,”26 but he 
does not treat justiciability as a question of Article III jurisdiction.27 (Indeed, Justice 
Brennan cites cases involving political questions in which the Court retained 
jurisdiction.28) Like many other separation of powers inquiries,29 the inquiry in Baker 
appears to be substantive—not jurisdictional. 
Nor did Justice Brennan endorse a categorical political question inquiry that 
would place whole classes of constitutional claims beyond the reach of federal courts. 
“Deciding whether a matter [is] committed by the Constitution to another branch of 
government,” Justice Brennan wrote, requires a “discriminating inquiry into the 
precise facts and posture of the particular case.”30 Justice Brennan resisted any 
“blanket rule” and emphasized the necessity of a “case-by-case inquiry” and a 
“discriminating analysis of the particular question posed.”31 
Only over time did the Baker factors mutate into what we see today: a doctrine 
that allegedly derives from Article III’s case-or-controversy language,32 denies a 
court authority to resolve the case before it,33 and consists of six “independent tests”34 
to identify the relevant class of constitutional claims that are outside of the Court’s 
jurisdiction and entrusted exclusively to the political branches.35  
So understood, the modern political question doctrine is wildly out of place. 
Under Article III, the judiciary has an obligation to decide cases properly before it,36 
 
 
 26. Id. at 210. 
 27. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 497–98. Compare Baker, 369 U.S. at 204–08 
(discussing standing), with id. at 208–37 (discussing justiciability).  
 28. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 214 (citing The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700 (1871), 
as an example of the Court deferring to the “political departments’ determination of dates of 
hostilities’ beginning and ending” in “private litigation”). 
 29. See, e.g., Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018) (“The separation of powers, 
among other things, prevents Congress from exercising the judicial power.”); Bank Markazi 
v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 (2016) (invoking Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 177 (1803), for the rule that Congress “may not usurp a court’s power to interpret and 
apply the law to the [circumstances] before it” (alteration in original)); Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (invoking Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), 
for the rule that Congress may not “vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials 
of the Executive Branch”); id. at 219 (holding that Congress may not “retroactively 
comman[d] the federal courts to reopen final judgments”). 
 30. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211, 211, 217 (emphasis added).  
 31. Id. at 211, 215. 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341–42, 352 
(2006); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).  
 33. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012); see also 13C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 
22, § 3534.3 n.9. (3d ed. 2008 Supp. 2019) (collecting cases). 
 34. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 35. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019) (citing Vieth, 541 U.S.
at 277). 
 36. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 194; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821); 
see also Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 274 (2008). 
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even those with “significant political overtones.”37 The modern doctrine is said to 
constitute “a narrow exception” to that constitutional responsibility,38 but why?  
Unlike most jurisdictional doctrines, which articulate the conditions that must be 
satisfied for a court to decide a legal issue, the modern political question doctrine 
purports to bar federal courts from entertaining certain constitutional cases at all.39 
Cases invoking the Guarantee Clause,40 certain cases implicating foreign affairs,41 or 
cases raising partisan-gerrymandering claims42 are all supposedly beyond the reach 
of federal courts. Such categorical denials of jurisdiction are difficult enough to 
explain as interpretations of the Constitution under Baker’s first factor.43 They 
become even more inexplicable under Baker’s five nontextual factors.  
The pliability of these criteria has “fostered a famous dialogue on the desirability 
of a ‘discretionary’ power to avoid decision of issues courts might simply wish to 
avoid.”44 According to Professor Rachel Barkow, “[c]ourts have used this prudential 
theory to delegate judicial authority to political actors (even when the Constitution 
does not contemplate such a delegation) and to avoid deciding controversial cases.”45 
Yet, this “prudential theory” is not one that the Roberts Court seems willing to 
embrace46—at least not explicitly.47 Discretionary jurisdiction sits uneasily with the 
Court’s power of judicial review, for “the power of judicial review rests ultimately 
upon the constitutional duty of the judiciary ‘to say what the law is.’”48 If the Court 
can choose to decline jurisdiction in one case for extraconstitutional reasons, then it 
 
 
 37. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). 
 38. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 195. 
 39. Grove, supra note 3, at 1909; see also Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the 
Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 456 (2004) (noting that the 
“categorical approach” to the political question doctrine places entire categories of 
constitutional cases “wholly within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress and the President”). 
 40. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980); Colegrove v. 
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 
223 U.S. 118, 140–51 (1912). 
 41. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see Seidman, supra note 39, at 455–56,       
456 n.61. 
 42. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019). 
 43. See Seidman, supra note 39, at 445–59 (discussing how purportedly jurisdictional 
grants of interpretive authority are functionally equivalent to substantive interpretations on the 
merits).  
 44. 13C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 3534.3 (3d ed. 2008 Supp. 2019). Compare 
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1959), with Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive 
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). 
 45. Barkow, supra note 10, at 253. 
 46. See infra text accompanying notes 51–57. 
 47. See Seidman, supra note 39, at 459–65 (“[I]f the passive virtues are to serve their 
intended function, they can do so only by misleading the country.”). 
 48. Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 
75 YALE L.J. 517, 518 (1966) (emphasis in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
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can choose to decline jurisdiction in any case.49 This would hardly be a “narrow 
exception” to the interpretive obligations imposed by Article III.50 
As a result, the Supreme Court has pivoted away from recognizing prudential 
bases for declining jurisdiction in recent decades, increasingly justifying its decisions 
in constitutional terms.51 In standing doctrine, the Court has moved its bar on 
“generalized grievances” from prudential to constitutional grounds;52 it has 
reconceptualized its “zone of interests” inquiry to pose a traditional question of 
interpretation;53 and it appears poised to recategorize its limitations on “third-party 
standing” as well.54  
The political question doctrine also reflects this trend towards explaining 
jurisdictional decisions in strictly constitutional terms.55 Over time, the Justices have 
observed that at least some of Baker’s factors seem more “prudential” than 
“constitutional.”56 The Court has pared these back accordingly, leaving only the 
“textual commitment” and “judicially manageable” factors in place in recent 
decades.57  
 But whittling down the number of factors misses the point: none of the nontextual 
factors (manageability included) should be considered “independent tests” of 
subject-matter jurisdiction as Justice Scalia claimed in Vieth.58 At most, the Baker 
factors provide practical and functional indicia from which a court might infer when, 
how, and the extent to which the Constitution entrusts an issue to a coordinate 
branch.59 Just as Baker’s first factor (a “textually demonstrable constitutional 
 
 
 49. See id. at 519. 
 50. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012). 
 51. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127, 127 
n.3 (2014). See generally Joel S. Nolette, Last Stand for Prudential Standing? Lexmark and 
Its Implications, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227 (2018). 
 52. See Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 127 n.3. 
 53. See id. at 127. 
 54. See id. at 127 n.3 (“The limitations on third-party standing are harder to classify . . . 
[but] consideration of that doctrine’s proper place in the standing firmament can await     
another day.”). 
 55. See Nolette, supra note 51, at 246–48. 
 56. Compare Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012) (only discussing the first two factors), 
with id. at 204 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (deeming the final three factors “prudential”), and 
id. at 212 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (deeming the final four factors “prudential”).  
 57. See id. at 195 (majority opinion); Nixon v. United States (Walter Nixon), 506 U.S. 
224, 228 (1993); Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The 
Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 
1213 (2002) (“[I]t seems fair to say that the only real components of the doctrine are the first 
two: a textually demonstrable commitment to the political branches and the lack of judicially 
manageable standards.”). 
 58. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 59. See Wechsler, supra note 44, at 7–8 (“[A]ll the doctrine can defensibly imply is that 
the courts are called upon to judge whether the Constitution has committed to another agency 
of government the autonomous determination of the issue raised, a finding that itself requires 
an interpretation. . . . What is explicit in the trial of an impeachment or, to take another case, 
the seating or expulsion of a Senator or Representative may well be found to be implicit in 
others.”) (footnote omitted).  
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commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department”60) is sure evidence 
that the legislature or executive was meant to have the final word on a question, the 
five nontextual Baker factors should be viewed as probative interpretive signals, not 
stand-alone jurisdictional standards. This means the “manageability” factor is no 
more or less “prudential” than any of the other nontextual factors.61 
In other words, the Court should not ask whether a factor applies and use that 
answer to deny jurisdiction. Instead, it should ask what the presence of a factor 
reveals about the meaning of the Constitution and use that answer to make 
substantive decisions about how to exercise its powers in coordination with the 
powers of another department within the context of the case before it.62 For example, 
“the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question”63 does not give the courts free-roving discretion to 
decline jurisdiction on a wholesale basis. Rather, it is probative of whether resolving 
a discrete issue in a case would require the court to exercise a function better suited 
(or more explicitly entrusted) to another actor.64 
By holding for the first time that manageability constitutes a freestanding test of 
jurisdiction, Rucho marks the final stage in the modern political question doctrine’s 
metamorphosis. The decision reveals as well as any the doctrine’s utter vacuity.  
Rucho reads as an homage to reasoned decision-making, legal principles, and 
constitutional fidelity, culminating in a strong rebuke of partisan-gerrymandering 
claims: “this is not law.”65 But the Chief doth protest too much.66 As a jurisdictional 
standard, manageability fails to provide the very touchstone of judicial power that 
Rucho demands: decision-making “according to legal principles.”67 Determining 
what is “manageable” boils down to prudence, pragmatics, and politics—not law.68 
This is the extraconstitutional essence of the modern political question doctrine.69 
To cover its tracks, the Rucho majority peddles demonstrable falsehoods,70 relies 
upon conclusory arguments,71 and muscles its way to a decision “in the absence of 
[any] constitutional directive or legal standards to guide . . . the exercise of [its] 
authority.”72 All of this to avoid doing what Article III required: resolve a properly 
presented dispute involving a cognizable constitutional harm.73 
 
 
 60. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 61. See Ron Park, Note, Is the Political Question Doctrine Jurisdictional or Prudential?, 
6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 255, 273 (2016). 
 62. See, e.g., Walter Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29 (noting that the first two principles are 
“not completely separate” because “the lack of judicially manageable standards may 
strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate 
branch”). 
 63. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 64. See infra Section III.B.  
 65. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019). 
 66. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2. 
 67. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (emphasis in original). 
 68. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 69. See Seidman, supra note 39, at 459–65. 
 70. See infra text accompanying notes 539–546. 
 71. See infra text accompanying notes 470–489. 
 72. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508. 
 73. See infra Section III.A (discussing how the Rucho plaintiffs presented a cognizable 
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A better path was available. Making sense of the political question doctrine could 
have offered insights that would have allowed the majority to more honestly engage 
with the questions at the heart of the political-gerrymandering debate.  
The three Parts that follow unwind the concepts and cases behind the modern 
doctrine to isolate its distinct variants, explore their legitimate separation of powers 
purposes, and identify the ways in which the modern doctrine unnecessarily preempts 
(and undermines) those purposes. 
II. JUDICIAL POWER AND POLITICAL REMEDIES 
Political questions occasionally arise when the federal courts are called to exercise 
equitable power to remedy a constitutional violation.74 In exploring and explaining 
the limits upon judicial power posed by such situations, the Court has variously 
deployed standing doctrine, the equitable remedies doctrine, and the political 
question doctrine.75  
When and why each applies, however, remains unclear. Across all three doctrines, 
the Court has vacillated between ascribing the limits on judicial power to the 
historical role76 of the “Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster”77 and 
attributing them to the textual allocation of powers and functions78 in the 
Constitution. These often align, for “history and tradition offer a meaningful guide” 
 
 
constitutional harm sufficient to support standing according to requirements set out in Gill v. 
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018)). 
 74. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549. 
552 (1946); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 475–76 (1903). 
 75. See infra Sections II.A, II.B, II.C. 
 76. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion) (discussing 
the political question doctrine and stating that the judicial power vested by Article III “is the 
power to act in the manner traditional for English and American courts”); Grupo Mexicano de 
Desarrollo v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 319 (1999) (discussing equitable remedies 
and asking “whether the relief . . . requested here was traditionally accorded by courts of 
equity”); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (discussing standing 
and stating, “We have always taken [the case-or-controversy requirement] to mean cases and 
controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.” 
(emphasis added)); see also Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2493–94 (citing standing cases in a political 
question case for the proposition that “federal courts can address only questions ‘historically 
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process’” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 
U.S. 83, 95 (1968))). 
 77. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
 78. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995) (discussing equitable remedies 
and stating that “federal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of 
state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution”); 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (denying standing because “[t]he Constitution, after 
all, assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to ‘take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 6, 
12 (holding controversy to be a nonjusticiable political question because U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
8, cl. 16, “vests in Congress the power: ‘[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, 
the Militia’”). 
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to understanding what the “judicial Power” of Article III encompasses.79 Yet this 
mode of analysis fails when the text of the Constitution pulls in a direction 
unimaginable to “the courts of Westminster.” Here the Court must grapple with the 
shape and substance of equitable power in a different system founded on different 
principles. 
“Equity evolved in England as a natural outgrowth of the King’s inherent power 
and duty to do justice.”80 Because the King was the “fountain[] of justice,” he “could 
grant relief when ordinary legal institutions were insufficient, unwilling, or unable to 
do so.”81 As more people sought relief from the King via his Chancellor, a “Court of 
Chancery gradually developed around the Chancellor to facilitate his role.”82 
Having traded the supremacy of a king for the supremacy of the Constitution and 
having merged the equity power into the “judicial power,”83 we should not be 
surprised when the historical role of the “chancellor” provides less meaningful 
guidance over time.84 As Professor Herbert Wechsler predicted, a common law 
constitutional system that grows through gradual adjudication and interpretation will 
inevitably lead to a proliferation and multiplicity of legitimate claims (and remedies) 
rooted in (and demanded by) the constitutional text.85 This is especially unavoidable 
in a modern administrative state, where federal, state, and local authorities—all of 
whom are accountable to the supreme law of the land—are involved in various facets 
of everyday life.86 
The Supreme Court’s difficulty in grappling with the scope and form of structural 
remedies over the last half century reflects this tension. In Brown v. Board of 
Education (Brown II), the Court sought to remedy the widespread violation of 
constitutional rights by government actors across hundreds of jurisdictions, many of 
whom were not open to complying in good faith with the Court’s interpretation of 
the Constitution.87 What is the proper role of the “chancellor” in such a situation?88 
In a tripartite, federal constitutional government, justice was not designed to flow 
from a single source but rather from the confluence of individually guaranteed rights 
 
 
 79. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273–74 (2008). 
 80. Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 58 B.C. L. REV. 217, 225 (2018). 
 81. Id. (alteration in original). 
 82. Id. at 226. 
 83. See id. at 224–31. 
 84. Cf. Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 829–
31 (1957) (describing the historical origins of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in England 
and the doctrine’s initially uncritical acceptance by federal courts in the United States despite 
the different underlying government structures and justifications). 
 85. Wechsler, supra note 44, at 7. 
 86. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 
2537, 2556 (1998) (discussing “the original presupposition that the Constitution would be 
implemented through an evolving remedial system”).  
 87. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 88. Ironically, the Court has drawn much of its modern articulation of “traditional” equity 
principles from the middle-to-late nineteenth century and early twentieth century—“when 
those rules were most systematically expounded”—rather than from the preconstitutional, 
revolutionary, or founding period. Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 
68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1022 (2015). These sources similarly predate the Court’s decision in 
Brown II. 
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and politically accountable powers. When these forces stand in tension, should one 
simply forfeit to the other? Even Justice Thomas—an ardent originalist and strict 
critic of the federal courts’ equitable powers—acknowledges that the courts cannot 
let such a violation go unrectified.89 
By teasing out and clarifying the purposes of each doctrine, the Court can more 
coherently distinguish when and how structural principles delimit judicial remedial 
authority. Standing doctrine, for example, bars a court from taking jurisdiction over 
a case when the remedy requested by a party would have no more than a “purely 
speculative” effect on the injury alleged in the pleadings.90 On the other hand, the 
equitable remedies doctrine constrains the scope of a court’s remedial authority at 
the conclusion of a case, confining the equitable power to those actions reasonably 
necessary to resolve and conclude the case.91 Both of these boundaries can be 
understood to derive from Article III, which confines the judicial power to cases and 
controversies.92 
The political question doctrine is different. And exploring how that doctrine has 
applied in the context of equitable remedies brings us to the first of three context-
specific variants of the political question doctrine: the “political remedies doctrine.”   
The political remedies doctrine arises when executive or legislative actors at the 
federal, state, or local level violate the constitution in a way that requires the federal 
courts to exercise their equitable powers in a broad or structural manner overlapping 
with traditionally executive or legislative functions. Professor John Harrison has 
identified this doctrine as a distinct strand of the political question doctrine, arguing 
that federal courts dismiss claims when the remedy necessary would require a court 
to “make the type of policy decisions normally entrusted to political actors” and 
would cause the court to “require or forbid some conduct that is itself legally 
indifferent.”93  
By surfacing this unique branch of the political question doctrine and 
demonstrating how different types of political questions arise in response to different 
exercises of judicial authority, Professor Harrison illuminates important nuances that 
the modern doctrine elides. Yet, the dividing line proposed by Harrison with respect 
to the political remedies doctrine is not so neat. In many cases, the Supreme Court 
has allowed courts to exercise broad equitable powers in ways that overlap with 
legislative and executive functions and that impact legally indifferent conduct.94  
Rather than understanding the political remedies doctrine to deny jurisdiction (or 
require dismissal) outright, I propose that the political remedies doctrine be 
 
 
 89. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 125, 133 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Federal judges cannot make . . . fundamentally political decisions” or “intrude into areas in 
which they have little expertise,” but the “extraordinary remedial measures” taken in the wake 
of Brown were appropriate given “the pace of desegregation and . . . the lack of a good-faith 
effort on the part of school boards.”). 
 90. See infra Section II.A. 
 91. See infra Section II.B. 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 93. Harrison, supra note 3, at 505. 
 94. See infra Section II.B. 
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understood to impose a substantive constraint on judicial power, requiring the court 
to tailor the scope of its remedy to prevent undue interference with political actors.95  
This is not a limit imposed by Article III. Rather, it is a border borne of conflict 
between two branches exercising their respective constitutional prerogatives. Thus, 
“political remedies” cases arise when a court possesses the constitutional power to 
impose an equitable remedy of its choosing but defers or tempers its exercise of 
power to allow a political actor to remedy the harm in the manner that actor sees fit.  
Such a political remedies doctrine better explains equity’s place within our 
constitutional system of separated powers and provides an explicit doctrinal vehicle 
for navigating the kinds of constitutional conflicts that have unnecessarily confused 
standing doctrine and the equitable remedies doctrine. The branches are not 
“‘hermetically’ sealed” from one another,96 and the instrumentalist intuition behind 
the Constitution’s checks and balances is that a “merging of functions” is (at times) 
“both desirable and unavoidable.”97 By giving the departments of government 
“partial agency . . . over . . . the acts of each other,”98 Madison recognized that “power 
can be checked only if it is shared.”99 
Rather than cutting off jurisdiction over whole categories of constitutional claims 
due to the existence of (or potential for) overlapping exercises of power at the 
conclusion of a case, the political remedies doctrine would require a substantive 
separation-of-powers analysis about which actor should be exercising which function 
at the remedial stage. In short, there may be instances where a court declines 
authority not because it lacks jurisdiction over a case under Article III, but because 
the court’s otherwise proper exercise of power faces external pressures from equally 
proper (and conflicting) exercises of constitutional authority by other actors.100  
 
 
 95. See infra Section II.C.  
 96. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
 97. Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 
30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 687–88 (1978) [hereinafter Nagel, Separation of Powers ]. 
 98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., First Signet 
Classic Printing 2003). 
 99. Nagel, Separation of Powers, supra note 97, at 682. 
 100. Compare infra Section II.A (discussing standing doctrine), with Section II.B 
(discussing equitable remedies doctrine), and Section II.C (discussing the political remedies 
doctrine). 
 The Supreme Court has occasionally indicated that the political question doctrine applies 
only to the horizontal separation of powers between the President, Congress, and the judiciary. 
See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976) (“[T]he separation-of-powers principle, like the 
political question doctrine, has no applicability to the federal judiciary’s relationship to the 
States.”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“[I]t is the relationship between the 
judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal 
judiciary’s relationship to the States, which gives rise to the ‘political question.’”). 
 The political remedies doctrine and political finality doctrine would take a more expansive 
view because they are concerned with conflicts between federal judicial power and any 
exercise of legislative or executive power by another actor properly vested with authority 
under the Constitution. In other words, conflicting exercises might not always emanate from 
Article I or Article II. State and local political actors may be vested with legislative or 
executive power, and the doctrines herein would navigate those conflicts as well. See, e.g., 
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 81 (1909) (accepting as conclusive the determination by the 
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Based on the facts of the case, these external pressures might override the judicial 
power only in part rather than in whole. In this way, the judiciary would “define its 
own authority according to the same principles that limit the powers of the other 
branches”101—with flexible and context-specific principles that take account of the 
constitutional tensions and dynamics raised by the case at hand.102 
A. Standing Doctrine—Redressability  
(Absence of Article III Jurisdiction at the Pleadings Stage) 
Article III of the Constitution vests the “judicial Power . . . in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may . . . ordain and establish.”103 This 
judicial power “extend[s]” to a set of “Controversies” and “Cases, in Law and 
Equity.”104 Thus, the Constitution explicitly locates equitable powers within the 
judicial power,105 while simultaneously confining the judiciary’s exercise of that 
power to “actual ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”106 
One of the doctrines that helps elucidate the meaning of this constitutional 
limitation is standing.107 Standing doctrine traditionally focuses on the party before 
a federal court, not the merits of the claim to be decided.108 To demonstrate that one 
is a “proper party”109 with an actual case or controversy sufficient to invoke the 
federal judicial power, plaintiffs must allege a cognizable injury that is “concrete, 
particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and 
redressable by a favorable ruling.”110  
Injury in fact, traceability, and redressability reflect the “irreducible constitutional 
minimum” required to open the courthouse doors and vest a federal court with 
jurisdiction to hear a case.111 The separation of powers concern in such a standing 
analysis is whether there is “too little” at stake to justify invoking the judicial power. 
 
 
governor of Colorado that a state of insurrection existed in the state). 
 101. Nagel, Separation of Powers, supra note 97, at 664. 
 102. See id. at 680–81, 697–700 (reading from United States v. Nixon (Richard Nixon), 
418 U.S. 683 (1974), a rule that when there are “two inconsistent claims for power” and each 
appears proper, the Court should “deny the claim that represents the greater intrusion into . . . 
the classically or textually defined function of the competing branch” while looking for “the 
least restrictive means of reconciling the powers of both branches”). 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 104. Id. § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 105. While there was debate over the scope and meaning of this vesting at the time of 
drafting and ratification, there is no doubt that this power was lodged within the judiciary. See 
Morley, supra note 80, at 231.  
 106. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). 
 109. See id. at 100–01; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and 
Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 644 (2006) 
[hereinafter Fallon, Justiciability and Remedies] (noting that standing focuses on “the ‘who’ 
of [the] litigation”). 
 110. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010) (citing Horne v. 
Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009)). 
 111. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).  
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By keeping judicial power tethered to real disputes, standing doctrine advances 
Article III’s limitation upon the exercise of that power and ensures that legal 
questions are resolved “in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic 
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”112 
At the pleadings stage, plaintiffs typically falter (if at all) on the injury-in-fact 
requirement. However, plaintiffs have occasionally failed to adequately plead that 
their injuries are “redressable” through judicial action. Here, structural concerns arise 
when a “desired exercise of the court’s remedial powers” would have a “purely 
speculative” impact on redressing the alleged injury.113 This limitation “prevents 
judicial decrees that have no effect in the real world”114 and prevents the Court from 
issuing advisory opinions.115 
In recent decades, however, “redressability” has transformed into an all-purpose 
separation of powers policing tool. 
First, the Court has imported the limitations underlying its equitable remedies 
doctrine116 and increasingly required plaintiffs to make rigorous factual showings at 
the pleadings stage.117 Traditional equity limitations should be understood as a 
reflection of the separation of powers in our modern system,118 but their structural 
purpose differs from standing. Equitable remedies doctrine limits the scope of 
authority to prevent overbroad orders at the remedies stage, not the existence of 
jurisdiction at the pleadings stage.119  
Specific factual evidence is required to justify equitable relief in a case over which 
a court already has jurisdiction,120 but “general factual allegations” should suffice to 
open the courthouse doors.121 An “indirect” theory of harm may make it more 
difficult to adequately allege that prospective relief will redress a plaintiff’s injury,122 
but courts should not require plaintiffs to “guarantee”123 or show a “substantial 
likelihood”124 that their desired relief will completely “remove” the alleged harm,125 
 
 
 112. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).  
 113. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42–43 (1976); see also Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 568–71.  
 114. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 635, 646–47 (1985). 
 115. See Fallon, Justiciability and Remedies, supra note 109, at 652. 
 116. See infra text accompanying notes 155–161. 
 117. See infra text accompanying notes 161–172. 
 118. See Nagel, Separation of Powers, supra note 97, at 674. 
 119. See infra text accompanying notes 146–154. 
 120. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 567 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The scope 
of permissible relief depends on the scope of any continuing violations, and therefore it was 
essential for the three-judge court to make a reliable determination of the extent of any 
violations as of the time its [remedial] order was issued.”). 
 121. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“At the pleading stage, general 
factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice” to establish 
“injury in fact.”).  
 122. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504–05 (1975). 
 123. See, e.g., Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86–87 (1981). 
 124. See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45–46 (1976). 
 125. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 504–05. 
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especially before the plaintiff has engaged in discovery and before the court has 
learned the actual facts of the case.126 If a plaintiff has a legitimate grievance and 
alleges that some nonspeculative relief appears likely, that should establish 
redressability for standing.127  
Second, the Court has raised wholly distinct separation of powers concerns in its 
redressability calculus, asking not only whether a remedy would have a speculative 
impact on the plaintiff but also whether the desired remedy would be appropriate for 
a court to provide.128 In Allen v. Wright, for example, the Court began its standing 
analysis by discussing the supposedly speculative nature of the desired remedy’s 
impact129 but then quickly shifted directions, stating: “We could not recognize 
respondents’ standing in this case without running afoul of [the] structural principle” 
that “[t]he Constitution . . . assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial 
Branch, the duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”130 According 
to the Court, the requested remedy would “have the federal courts as virtually 
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”131 For 
support, the Court threw in a citation to Gilligan v. Morgan—a political question 
case.132 
This rationale for declining judicial action is wholly different than the rationale at 
the heart of the standing doctrine. Standing is concerned that there is “too little” at 
stake to constitute a case or controversy; Allen is concerned that the court will be 
asked to do “too much” to resolve that case or controversy.133 Rather than the threat 
to the separation of powers coming from the danger of issuing an advisory opinion,134 




 126. See Laura E. Little, It’s About Time: Unravelling Standing and Equitable Ripeness, 
41 BUFF. L. REV. 933, 949 (1993) (observing how increasing the burden on plaintiffs at the 
pleading stage “makes cautious reflection on the propriety of prospective relief impossible” 
because the requirement of an “up-front decision” precludes the court and parties from 
“explor[ing] the possible ramifications of the rejected injunction and [the possibility of] 
tailor[ing] an appropriate decree”). 
 127. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“[I]t must be ‘likely,’ as 
opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” 
(quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43)); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 130 (1983) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[Q]uestions concerning remedy [should be] relevant to the 
threshold issue of standing only in the limited sense that some relief must be possible.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 128. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984).  
 129. See id. at 757–59. 
 130. Id. at 761 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
 131. Id. at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). 
 132. See id. (citing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
 133. See Fallon, Justiciability and Remedies, supra note 109, at 649–52. 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 111–115. 
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 130–131; see also Juliana v. United States, 947 
F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509, 2515 
(2019), and holding that the federal courts lack the authority to redress climate change issues). 
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This is the domain of the political question doctrine.136 As Justice Stevens 
observed in his dissent, the Allen Court’s decision “confuses the standing doctrine 
with the justiciability of the issues.”137 “If a plaintiff presents a nonjusticiable issue, 
or seeks relief that a court may not award, then its complaint should be dismissed for 
those reasons, and not because the plaintiff lacks a stake in obtaining that relief and 
hence has no standing.”138 The specific reasons underlying the dismissal matter. “A 
ruling that Article III requirements are not satisfied” when the real concern is 
interference with legislative or executive functions “creates the risk that relief will 
be denied even when the restraints of comity and federalism do not justify that 
result.”139  
Perhaps the Allen Court declined to invoke the political question doctrine because 
the modern doctrine has become a weapon too powerful to use. The unusual way the 
modern doctrine categorically strips whole clauses of judicial oversight should make 
the Court wary. Yet, the solution to this problem is to rein in the political question 
doctrine, not complicate or extend standing doctrine to fill the gap.140 
Rather than asking standing to shoulder distinct and contradictory separation of 
powers purposes, the Court should recognize the unique structural functions of the 
equitable remedies doctrine and the political remedies doctrine. These doctrines 
shape the scope of judicial authority at the remedies stage rather than denying the 
existence of judicial authority at the pleadings stage. 
B. The Equitable Remedies Doctrine  
(Article III Constraints on the Scope of Judicial Authority at the Remedies Stage) 
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has invoked the “law of equitable remedies” 
in cases involving both private parties141 and public actors.142 In both circumstances, 
the Court has appealed to the historical or traditional role of equity and of the 
courts.143 “For example, in [eBay v. MercExchange]—a mere eight pages in the U.S. 
Reports—the word tradition or a cognate appears fourteen times. That is the same 
number of times tradition appears in the first song of Fiddler on the Roof.”144 What 
 
 
 136. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 137. Allen, 468 U.S. at 790 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 791; see also Fallon, Justiciability and Remedies, supra note 109, at 690 
(suggesting that the Supreme Court should decide cases based on the doctrine—standing, 
substantive, or remedial—that “would most perspicuously guide future analysis and produce 
the best outcomes in lower court decisions”); Nichol, supra note 114, at 649 (observing that a 
“hybrid standing analysis rather than the overt separation of powers scrutiny demanded by the 
political question doctrine” allows the Court to avoid meaningful inquiries into—and 
explanations about—the scope of its own power). 
 139. 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 3531.6. 
 140. See Nichol, supra note 114, at 657–58 (“If a case threatens the appropriate separation 
of powers, it should be dismissed; but it should be dismissed under a doctrine that considers 
such intrusion as its decisive factor—that is, the political question doctrine.”). 
 141. See Bray, supra note 88, at 1000 n.5 (collecting cases). 
 142. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 538 (2011); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 
88 (1995); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376–77 (1976). 
 143. See Bray, supra note 88, at 1000. 
 144. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 
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seems to be missing, however, is a “justification . . . for retaining the distinction 
between legal and equitable remedies in contemporary American law.”145  
Article III’s confining of the judicial (and equitable) power to resolving cases and 
controversies provides this justification.146 Equitable discretion allows judges to craft 
remedies that are tailored to the particulars of a case, but it is widely understood that 
discretion has limits.147 Those limits prevent a court’s equitable powers from being 
used as “a cloak for arbitrary judicial policymaking.”148 Whether in a dispute 
between private parties or a dispute involving government actors, Article III prohibits 
courts from exercising equitable powers beyond those reasonably necessary to 
resolve and conclude the particular case. If the law provides a complete remedy, 
federal courts have no authority to go further.149 
The equitable remedies doctrine reflects the unsurprising fact that even a court 
with jurisdiction over a case lacks the authority under Article III to do whatever it 
wants.150 In correcting the consequences of a violation of law, a court’s remedial 
orders may affect third parties who are party to a suit.151 This is not a new feature of 
equitable power unique to modern “structural” injunctions—even traditional 
equitable remedies were known to have some effect on third parties who had dealings 
with the parties themselves.152 A court’s remedial orders must be grounded in a 
“finding that legal remedies are not adequate”153 and must be “designed as nearly as 
possible” to rectify the harm caused by the violation of law,154 however, to ensure 
the court regulates as little legally indifferent conduct (public or private) as possible. 
While standing doctrine determines whether there are sufficient factual 
allegations to warrant vesting a court with jurisdiction over a case at the pleadings 
stage, equitable remedies doctrine determines whether there are sufficient factual 
findings to justify the scope of equitable power being exercised at the remedies stage. 
Both limits derive from Article III’s case and controversy language, but their 
justifications and implications are different. If a plaintiff lacks standing, the court 




 145. Id. at 1050.  
 146. See Nagel, Separation of Powers, supra note 97, at 674 (noting that the “traditional 
equity jurisdiction” cases reflect the concern that courts not invade the domain of the political 
branches).  
 147. Bray, supra note 88, at 1041. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (“[F]ederal-court 
decrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself. Because of this 
inherent limitation upon federal judicial authority, federal-court decrees exceed appropriate 
limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or does 
not flow from such a violation . . . .”). That is not to say that the Court’s operationalization of 
this concept is without problems.  
 150. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161 (1971) (“The remedial powers of an 
equity court must be adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited.”). 
 151. See Nagel, Separation of Powers, supra note 97, at 711, 715. 
 152. Id. at 711. 
 153. Bray, supra note 88, at 1038. 
 154. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995) (quoting Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280–81).  
2020] GERRYMANDERING & JUSTICIABILITY  1313 
 
plaintiff demands an overbroad remedy, the court only has authority to enter a 
narrower remedy because no more is required to resolve the case or controversy.  
The Supreme Court’s blurring of these concepts has unnecessarily complicated 
standing doctrine, equitable remedies doctrine, and the political question doctrine.  
First, the Court has been vague about the relationship between standing and the 
equitable remedies doctrine. At times the Court seems to blend them, contending that 
a court’s reasons for denying standing “shade into those determining whether the 
complaint states a sound basis for equitable relief.”155 At other times, the Court seems 
to set them side by side, contending that equitable remedy considerations provide 
additional reasons for dismissal beyond standing—an advisory position that may 
itself raise Article III concerns.156 At other times still, the Court seems to replace the 
role of equitable remedies doctrine altogether by speaking about standing in 
unconventional ways.157 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, for example, Justice Scalia noted that the 
elements of standing “must be supported in the same way as any other matter on 
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of 
evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.”158 Four years later, 
Justice Scalia deployed this concept in Lewis v. Casey to limit a remedial order that 
swept beyond the “actual injur[ies]” identified by the district court.159 There, he 
observed that “[t]he actual-injury requirement would hardly serve [its] purpose” of 
limiting judicial power if a plaintiff could “demonstrate[] harm from one particular 
inadequacy” and then rely on that harm to seek a remedy addressing unrelated 
“inadequacies.”160 Invoking an equitable remedies principle (and citing to equitable 
remedies cases), Justice Scalia wrote, “The remedy must of course be limited to the 
inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.”161 
As a technical matter, there is perhaps little difference between attributing this 
principle to standing doctrine or equitable remedies doctrine. The benefit “of casting 
th[is] conclusion in the language of standing [is] obscure,”162 but if no relief can be 
accorded once the facts have been adduced at trial then it is not incorrect to conclude 
 
 
 155. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974). 
 156. Compare id. (“[E]ven if we were inclined to consider the complaint as presenting an 
existing case or controversy, we would firmly disagree . . . that an adequate basis for equitable 
relief . . . had been stated.”), with id. at 504 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“When we [hold that 
a plaintiff lacks standing], it follows . . . that we are precluded from considering any other 
issue presented for review. Thus, the Court’s additional discussion of the question whether a 
case for equitable relief was stated amounts to an advisory opinion that we are powerless to 
render.”). 
 157. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357–60 (1996); 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra 
note 22, § 3531.6 (“A rather more confused nexus between standing and remedial decisions 
was drawn in Lewis v. Casey.”). 
 158. 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 
 159. See 518 U.S. at 357–60. 
 160. Id. at 357. 
 161. Id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88, 89 (1995)); see also id. at 359–60 
(citing to Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977); Califano v. Yamasaki, 
442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)). 
 162. 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 3531.6. 
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that the plaintiffs lack standing at the end of the day.163 As Justice Souter noted in 
dissent, “it is true that the demise of [the plaintiffs’] claims could be expressed as a 
failure of proof on the merits (and I would so express it), [and] it would be equally 
correct to see these plaintiffs as losing on standing.”164  
As a practical matter, however, “casting th[is] conclusion in the language of 
standing”165 triggers a host of easily avoidable errors with profound consequences 
for litigants. “Standing” is traditionally understood to refer to the sufficiency of 
allegations on the pleadings, and failure under that doctrine is traditionally 
understood to divest the court of jurisdiction over the case as a whole.166 Invoking 
“standing” to describe situations where a proper plaintiff is before a court vested with 
subject-matter jurisdiction but has only proven enough facts at trial to get a partial 
remedy causes the word “standing” (and the word “jurisdiction”) to carry too many 
meanings for careful and correct application in the mine-run of cases. It is more 
natural (and less prone to mistake) to say that “the state of the evidence simply left 
[the court] without an adequate basis for the exercise of its equitable discretion in 
issuing [a broader] order . . . .”167 
This is not just a matter of linguistic nicety. Litigants should be able to challenge 
unlawful practices “and to obtain whatever relief a court may ultimately deem 
appropriate” without having to wrangle on the pleadings about whether the 
“particular forms of relief” requested will pan out exactly as initially envisioned.168 
Conceiving of remedial options in standing terms has led courts to hold that “a 
separate showing of standing for each form of relief” must be shown from the outset 
of a case contrary to the “traditional conception of standing and of the remedial 
powers of the federal courts.”169  
The risk of conflating standing doctrine with the equitable remedies doctrine may 
also tempt courts to collapse “jurisdictional and remedial concerns into a single 
threshold enterprise.”170 This prevents courts from ever learning important details 
about the alleged violation of law and the balance of interests involved—details that 
 
 
 163. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury 
resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice;” whereas, “at the final stage, those facts 
(if controverted) must be ‘supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.’” (quoting 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n.31 (1979))); see 13A WRIGHT 
& MILLER, supra note 22, § 3531.6 (“A determination even at the end of trial that the court is 
not prepared to award any remedy that would benefit the plaintiff[s] may be expressed as a 
conclusion that the plaintiff[s] lack[] standing.”). 
 164. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 395 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 165. 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 3531.6. 
 166. See id. § 3531. 
 167. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 397 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 168. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 114 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 169. Id. at 122–23; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) 
(“[O]ur standing cases confirm that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he 
seeks to press. We have insisted, for instance, that ‘a plaintiff must demonstrate standing 
separately for each form of relief sought.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000))). 
 170. Little, supra note 126, at 947. 
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might otherwise influence the court’s decision as to whether to provide relief.171 
Framing remedial limitations in standing terms risks undermining the very values 
and nuance that equitable principles were designed to foster.172 
Thus, there is nothing to gain and much to lose by using the language of 
“standing” and “jurisdiction” to describe tailored constraints on the contours of a 
court’s equitable authority based on facts found at trial. These limitations are far 
more accurately described and understood under the equitable remedies doctrine. 
And that doctrine can be—and should be—rooted in Article III’s language confining 
the judicial power to resolving concrete cases and controversies. 
Second, the Court has lumped concerns about improper interference with federal, 
state, and local political actors173 into the equitable remedies doctrine even though 
this concern would more appropriately be managed by a “political remedies” 
doctrine.174  
Under the equitable remedies doctrine, Article III provides a centripetal constraint 
upon exercises of a court’s equitable powers when those powers sweep more broadly 
than required to resolve a case or controversy. This constraint upon the equitable 
powers of the federal courts exists and applies whether the defendant is a government 
actor or a private party.175  
Under the political remedies doctrine, on the other hand, a court faces constraints 
upon its equitable powers based on a conflict between two equally legitimate 
exercises of constitutional authority. This arises when the breadth of the court’s 
equitable power under Article III is justified by its factual findings, but remedying 
the violation would require the court to exercise legislative or executive functions to 
an unacceptable degree.176 In such cases, the court is limited not by Article III but by 
other provisions in the Constitution that have drawn the court into conflict with 
another actor properly vested with governmental authority.177  
Admittedly, a court would likely use similar tools and tests when applying the 
equitable remedies doctrine or the political remedies doctrine. Under both, a court 
must tailor the temporal and substantive terms of its remedial orders to ensure that 
the exercise of its equitable power is constitutionally valid. 
 
 
 171. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes 
on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1984); see also 13A WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 22, § 3531.6; Little, supra note 126, at 947, 948–49 (“With full 
development of the facts motivating a dispute, a federal court may readily grant relief that the 
court was actually inclined to deny at the inception of the suit.”).  
 172. See Little, supra note 126, at 951–52. 
 173. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995) (quoting Milliken II, 433 U.S. 
267, 280–81 (1977)); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361 (1996).  
 174. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349 (“It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in 
individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not 
the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in 
such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.”). 
 175. See Bray, supra note 88, at 1038 (noting that equitable remedies are considered 
“exceptional” by the Court in private party suits and noting that “[a]ny departure from the 
norm [of legal remedies] demands justification . . . even if it is easily made”). 
 176. See infra Section II.C. 
 177. See infra Section II.C. 
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Given the distinct source and force of each doctrine, however, these tools and tests 
might be employed with differing degrees of rigor and deference. In a case involving 
private actors, the factual findings required to justify equitable action may be 
minimal and the discretion available to the court in structuring its remedy may be 
wide.178 In a case involving public authorities, the factual findings required may be 
greater and the discretion available to the court may be narrower.179 That is because 
the court’s duty under the political remedies doctrine is to balance two demands: 
ensuring the violation is remedied and giving the political actor discretion in the 
means of compliance. If a recalcitrant actor fails to timely comply in good faith, 
stronger and more specific remedial measures may be warranted to strike the right 
balance.180  
C. The Political Remedies Doctrine  
(Conflicting Constitutional Authority at the Remedies Stage) 
By now it may be clear that the Supreme Court has been applying a version of the 
“political remedies doctrine” for more than half a century under various names and 
labels.181 Whether expressed through unconventional (or unprincipled) applications 
of standing doctrine,182 through rigorous applications of the equitable remedies 
doctrine,183 or through the political question doctrine,184 the Court reins in lower 
courts’ equitable powers when they come into tension with exercises of legislative 
or executive authority. This occurs even when Article III confers judicial authority 
to rectify a constitutional wrong under traditional standing or equitable remedy rules. 
 
 
 178. See Bray, supra note 88, at 1038 (noting that district courts “must make an explicit 
finding that legal remedies are not adequate,” but also that “the Court has not made it difficult 
to make that finding”) (emphasis in original). 
 179. See infra text accompanying notes 187–192.  
 180. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 125 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 181. See, e.g., Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299, 300–01 (1955) (“School authorities have the 
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have 
to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of 
the governing constitutional principles.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 193–219 
(discussing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 14 (1973), and Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493,   
567 (2011)). 
 182. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984) (denying standing in part because, 
“[c]arried to its logical end, [plaintiffs’] approach would have the federal courts as virtually 
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action” (quoting Laird v. 
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972))); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (denying 
standing in part because plaintiffs’ requested relief “seems to us nothing less than an ongoing 
federal audit of state criminal proceedings”). 
 183. See, e.g., Plata, 563 U.S. at 555 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking Baker-like factors 
in an equitable remedies analysis, including the commitment of functions to political actors 
and the incompetence of judges in setting policy preferences). 
 184. See Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 11–12; see also Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political 
Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 618 n.59 (1976) (“Among the considerations in 
Justice Brennan’s list in Baker v. Carr, several seem more persuasive as reasons to deny an 
equitable remedy, or a particular equitable remedy, than to support a finding of 
nonjusticiability . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
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By recognizing that the Constitution confers overlapping powers and that liberty 
and justice are secured through their tension, the Court can evaluate separation of 
powers questions more honestly. The Court need not cut off jurisdiction entirely to 
acknowledge that a conflict between constitutional demands may affect the breadth 
and application of its normal equitable authority185 or—in rare cases—render judicial 
relief unavailable.186 
When a governmental actor violates the Constitution and equitable relief is 
necessary, the political remedies doctrine should require courts to find “the least 
restrictive means of reconciling the powers of both branches.”187 As Professor Robert 
Nagel has argued, the more generalized assertion should yield to the more specific 
need, but “the losing claim [should] be subordinated only to the minimum extent 
necessary to resolve the conflict between the branches.”188 Typically, this means a 
court should tailor the temporal and/or substantive scope of its remedy, leaving the 
political actor discretion to choose its preferred means of compliance with the 
constitutional demands articulated by the court.189 However, in the rare case where 
“the relationship between political and judicial power means that no relief can be 
granted,” the claim may be dismissed as nonjusticiable.190 Rather than operating as 
a limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction under Article III, however, the doctrine 
would require dismissal based on a substantive separation of powers interpretation 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).191 
To evaluate whether a remedy involves exercising legislative or executive 
functions, the court might consider—among other interpretive clues—the Baker 
factors. For example, if (1) the function is textually committed to a political actor, 
(2) the standards governing the creation of the remedy are difficult to discern, (3) 
crafting the remedy would require “an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
for nonjudicial discretion,” and/or (4) the remedy might reflect a lack of due 
respect,192 then the court’s exercise of remedial power may well be overlapping with 
executive or legislative power. 
Gilligan v. Morgan shows how the political remedies doctrine could lead to the 
outright dismissal of a claim.193 In May 1970, the Ohio National Guard was called 
out to Kent State University by the Governor of Ohio in response to protests.194 In 
the chaos that followed, guardsmen killed four students and wounded nine others. 
After the tragedy, students at Kent State sought injunctive relief to prevent such an 
event from occurring again.195 Although the Ohio National Guard adopted new use-
 
 
 185. See infra text accompanying notes 208–220.  
 186. See infra text accompanying notes 193–207. 
 187. Nagel, Separation of Powers, supra note 97, at 698.  
 188. Id. at 699–700. 
 189. See id. at 709 (“[T]he plausibility that the injunctive language is necessary to fulfill 
the courts’ constitutional function decreases as the gap between the generality of the 
constitutional language and the specificity of the injunctive language increases.”). 
 190. Harrison, supra note 3, at 496.  
 191. Id. at 487–89; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 192. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 193. 413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 194. Id. at 3. 
 195. Id. at 3–4. 
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of-force rules and initiated new training related to civil-disorder control after the 
event, the Supreme Court found the action was not moot because the plaintiffs had 
requested additional injunctive and supervisory relief above and beyond the changes 
implemented by the National Guard.196 This additional relief sought by the plaintiffs 
envisioned the district court “assum[ing] continuing regulatory jurisdiction over the 
activities of the Ohio National Guard” and “establish[ing] standards for [its] training, 
kind of weapons and scope[,] and kind of orders to control [its] actions.”197 
The Supreme Court held that no justiciable controversy was presented “in this 
case.”198 Relying on the traditional Baker factors, the Court invoked “the explicit 
command of Art. I, § 8, cl. 16, [of the Constitution], which vests in Congress the 
power: ‘[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia.’”199 The 
relief sought “would therefore embrace critical areas of responsibility vested by the 
Constitution” in the political branches.200 The Court also observed that it would be 
“difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have 
less competence” and that “[t]he complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to 
the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are . . . 
appropriately vested in branches of the government which are periodically subject to 
electoral accountability.”201 
Yet the Court also noted its decision was a narrow one, focused on the specific 
remedy sought in the specific case at hand. Chief Justice Burger wrote that the Court 
was “neither hold[ing] nor imply[ing] that the conduct of the National Guard is 
always beyond judicial review or that there may not be accountability in a judicial 
forum for violations of law or for specific unlawful conduct by military personnel, 
whether by way of damages or injunctive relief.”202 The Court explicitly left open 
the door for future plaintiffs to seek “a restraining order against some specified and 
imminently threatened unlawful [military] action.”203 
Gilligan therefore hardly stands for the proposition that military decisions are 
unamenable to judicial standards or subject only to “self-monitoring” by the political 
branches. As Professor Harrison observes, the political remedies doctrine only limits 
the “judicial displacement of discretion, not the application of legal standards to 
military decisions.”204 While “[e]xtensive judicial control of military policy” is not 
permitted, “military decisions [are] still subject to the law.”205  
In Gilligan, the Court did not face an intransigent political actor, defiantly 
condoning unconstitutional behavior or evading good-faith compliance. The 
 
 
 196. Id. at 4–5. 
 197. Id. at 5–6. 
 198. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
 199. Id. at 6 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16). 
 200. Id. at 7. 
 201. Id. at 10. 
 202. Id. at 11–12 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Court made good on its 
promise regarding damages in Scheuer v. Rhodes, another case arising from the Kent State 
massacre in which the Court held that the plaintiffs’ claims were not barred by sovereign 
immunity. 416 U.S. 232, 238–49 (1974). 
 203. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 5.  
 204. Harrison, supra note 3, at 483. 
 205. Id. 
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National Guard had already corrected the deficiencies it considered to be the cause 
of the constitutional violations: its training and use-of-force rules.206 Although the 
case technically was not moot because the plaintiffs requested additional relief, that 
additional relief involved little more than a displacement of the political actor’s 
proper authority, constitutional role, and legally indifferent sphere of discretion.207 
Thus, the political remedies doctrine required dismissal of the claim as 
nonjusticiable.  
Brown v. Plata shows how the political remedies doctrine can be applied without 
dismissing a claim outright as nonjusticiable.208 Although Plata is not traditionally 
understood as a “political question” case, it should be.209 In Plata, the Supreme Court 
reviewed a remedial order entered to address prison-crowding levels causing Eighth 
Amendment violations.210 The majority held that courts must be sensitive to the 
state’s “interest in punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation” and must exhibit 
deference to “experienced and expert prison administrators faced with the difficult 
and dangerous task of housing large numbers of convicted criminals.”211 
Nevertheless, “[c]ourts may not allow constitutional violations to continue simply 
because a remedy would involve intrusion into the realm of prison administration.”212  
The Court struck this balance by emphasizing that courts should give politically 
accountable actors wide latitude to cure constitutional defects themselves, restricting 
that latitude only as necessary to ensure timely, good-faith compliance.213 As a 
general legal principle, this position received unanimous support.214 Justice Alito and 
 
 
 206. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 4–5. 
 207. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (“Remedial 
judicial authority does not put judges automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose 
powers are plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local authority defaults.”). 
 208. 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
 209. See Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the 
Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 651 (1989) [hereinafter Nagel, Political 
Law, Legalistic Politics] (discussing the political question debate between Wechsler and 
Bickel, observing that “[t]he analogous issue today arises at the remedial stage of a lawsuit,” 
and providing examples of “political” considerations entering courts’ remedial calculus in 
school desegregation and prison standards cases); Seidman, supra note 39, at 468–69 (“[T]he 
law of constitutional remedy lies outside the bounds of constitutionalism” because “when the 
Court turned to remedy [in Brown II], the issues became practical and political rather than 
principled and constitutional.”). 
 210. 563 U.S. at 499–500. 
 211. Id. at 511. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 500–02, 510, 511. In Plata, the Court’s review of the remedial measures was 
influenced by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995—a statutory regime enacted by 
Congress to govern the courts’ remedial processes in such cases. See id. at 500, 511–13. 
Nonetheless, the Court pointed out that the Act “should not be interpreted to place undue 
restrictions on the authority of federal courts to fashion practical remedies when confronted 
with complex and intractable constitutional violations” and that “[a] reading of the [Act] that 
would render population limits unavailable in practice would raise serious constitutional 
concerns.” Id. at 526. 
 214. See id. at 565 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he Constitution does not give 
federal judges the authority to run state penal systems” and that “States are generally free to 
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Chief Justice Roberts dissented on narrow grounds, arguing that “an adequate but 
less drastic remedial plan could have been crafted.”215 Justices Scalia and Thomas 
critiqued the breadth of modern structural injunctions (including the one at issue),216 
but acknowledged that structural equitable relief may be available in limited 
circumstances.217 
While Plata is ostensibly not a political question case, Justice Scalia’s dissent 
provides a classic political question analysis. Justice Scalia argues that structural 
injunctions “require judges to play a role essentially indistinguishable from the role 
ordinarily played by executive officials” and “force judges to engage in a form of 
factfinding-as-policymaking that is outside the traditional judicial role.”218 
According to Justice Scalia, this necessitates “the sort of predictive judgment that 
our system of government allocates to other government officials” and invites 
“judges to indulge policy preferences” that they are “incompetent” to make.219  
This functional analysis of respective constitutional roles aligns, unsurprisingly, 
with some of the nontextual Baker factors commonly invoked in domestic political 
question cases: a lack of judicially manageable standards, the necessity of making 
policy decisions not typically made by judges, and the difficulty of providing an 
independent resolution while respecting the decisions of political officials.220 
When a court turns to the remedies stage of a case, “the issues [become] practical 
and political rather than principled and constitutional.”221 The degree of 
enforcement—the strictness and structure of any particular remedy—will necessarily 
involve value-laden judgments.222 But that does not make their resolution by a 
judicial actor exceptional or constitutionally inappropriate—these functional 
overlaps between the branches necessarily exist on a spectrum.223 Sometimes a 
political actor’s otherwise legitimate executive or legislative authority will conflict 
with a federal court’s legitimate equitable authority to remedy a violation of rights.  
Political authorities may comply with constitutional commands in a manner 
different than envisioned by the court.224 It is the political departments’ prerogative 
 
 
make these decisions as they choose,” but recognizing that “[t]he Eighth Amendment imposes 
an important—but limited—restraint on state authority in this field” and that “[f]ederal courts 
have the responsibility to ensure that this constitutional standard is met”); see also id. at 563–
64 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that a court may order extremely limited structural relief to 
alter specific conditions that deprive each member of a class of their Eighth Amendment rights, 
or may order a prisoner’s release only if “it determines that the prisoner is suffering from a 
violation of his constitutional rights, and that his release, and no other relief, will remedy that 
violation”). 
 215. Id. at 574 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 216. See id. at 554–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 217. See id. at 563–64. 
 218. Id. at 555. 
 219. Id. at 557–58. 
 220. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 221. Seidman, supra note 39, at 468. 
 222. See id. at 468–69. 
 223. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977). 
 224. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1787 (1991) (“[A] complaint about [the 
substitution of one remedy for another that is preferred by the claimant] can rarely be of 
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to use discretion in exercising their powers; it is the judicial department’s duty to 
ensure that the exercise of those powers does not violate the Constitution. On rare 
occasions, such as Gilligan, the conflict may require a court to declare a claim 
nonjusticiable. But this is usually the exception to the rule, when good-faith 
compliance has cured all cause for constitutional concern.225 
The political remedies doctrine creates space for interbranch dialogue about 
political preferences, the relative institutional competencies of the institutions 
involved, and the constitutional sufficiency of the solutions envisioned, with courts 
empowered to modulate the scope of their remedial involvement in a way tailored to 
the specific dynamics and issues raised in the case. Rather than denying the existence 
or significance of practical factors in shaping equitable remedies, the doctrine would 
make their role explicit and allow courts to defer where appropriate. 
* * * 
With respect to redistricting, the political remedies doctrine provides a conceptual 
framework for understanding a host of principles that the Supreme Court has 
imposed on district courts overseeing redistricting remedies.226 We are well beyond 
the day when implementing a remedial plan simpliciter could be considered an 
unconstitutional exercise of equitable power under the political question doctrine,227 
but the political remedies doctrine still regulates judicial involvement in this sensitive 
 
 
constitutional dimension.” (alteration in original) (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of 
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. 
REV. 1362, 1366 (1953))); Seidman, supra note 39, at 469 (“The decision to impose one 
remedy rather than another is . . . political . . . .”). 
 225. The political remedies doctrine would not, for example, sanction a complete failure 
to remedy an identified constitutional harm based on the court supposedly lacking authority 
over an entire category of constitutional claims. There is a difference between deferring to a 
political actor’s good-faith remedy (as in Gilligan) and categorically foreclosing a judicial 
remedy in response to an actor’s bad faith. The latter conception of the doctrine has a 
particularly odious history stretching back to the Court’s 1903 decision in Giles v. Harris. 189 
U.S. 475 (1903). In Giles, the Court held that it could not provide “a remedy for political 
wrongs” and stood idly by in the face of a sweeping disenfranchisement scheme targeting 
black voters. See id. at 486. In a shocking declaration of its own perceived impotence, the 
Court stated that “[u]nless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that State by officers of 
the court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff could get from equity would be an empty 
form.” Id. at 488. Once the Court had effectively blessed these schemes with its categorical 
abdication, they spread to other states and “virtual[ly] eliminat[ed] black citizens from political 
participation in the South” for well over half-a-century. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-
Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 297, 313 (2000). In Louisiana, for 
example, the number of black voters on the registration rolls dropped from 130,334 to 730 
between 1896 and 1910. Id. at 303. 
 226. See generally G. Michael Parsons, Justice Denied: Equity, Elections, and Remedial 
Redistricting Rules, 19 J.L. SOC’Y 229 (2019) [hereinafter Parsons, Justice Denied]. 
 227. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552–53 (1946) (plurality opinion) (“Of course 
no court can affirmatively re-map [congressional] districts so as to bring them more in 
conformity with the standards of fairness for a representative system. At best we could only 
declare the existing electoral system invalid.”). 
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area so judges do not impose maps based on their own views of what a “fair” system 
looks like. 
A federal court usually must afford legislators an opportunity to enact a 
replacement plan when a constitutional violation is found.228 And, even if the 
legislature fails to comply and the court must draw a replacement map, the court must 
limit its changes to remedying the constitutional violation,229 guided by whatever 
legitimate policy preferences underlie the challenged map.230 All of these principles 
should be understood as instantiations of the political remedies doctrine. 
The political remedies doctrine recognizes that federal courts have the power to 
remedy identifiable violations of the Constitution but are “ill suited” to undertake (in 
the first instance) the kind of freeform districting that relies upon an exercise of 
“political judgment.”231 When a wholesale overhaul of a redistricting plan is 
unnecessary to correct a constitutional harm but the courts charge forward anyway, 
they “go beyond requiring compliance with the law and require or forbid some 
conduct that is itself legally indifferent.”232  
There is, to be sure, a danger in overdoctrinalizing the exercise of equitable 
power.233 Courts must retain the ability to “mould each decree to the necessities of 
the particular case”234 to ensure bad faith is not rewarded. Clear rules can be 
gamed,235 and excessive deference to political remedies might incentivize 
unconstitutional conduct by lowering the “cost” of constitutional violations.236 
Whatever the proper balance, however, the political remedies doctrine makes one 
thing clear: curing political-gerrymandering violations would require no more or less 
judicial intrusion than any other redistricting claim. Some cases (such as racial 
gerrymandering cases) may require revising only a handful of district boundaries, 
whereas other cases (such as one-person, one-vote cases) may implicate so many 
districts that a new map is necessary.237 Either way, the remedy would remain 
“limited to the inadequacy that produced [the] injury in fact”238 and could be 
entrusted to the legislature in the first instance. 
 
 
 228. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978). 
 229. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 43 (1982). 
 230. Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 393 (2012) (quoting Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 
79 (1997)). 
 231. See id. 
 232. Harrison, supra note 3, at 505. 
 233. See generally Parsons, Justice Denied, supra note 226. 
 234. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (quoting Hecht 
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)). 
 235. See generally Parsons, Justice Denied, supra note 226. 
 236. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation 
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 419 (2000). 
 237. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018). 
 238. See id. (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996)). 
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III. JUDICIAL POWER AND POLITICAL ADJUDICATION 
Political questions most commonly arise when the federal courts are called to 
decide cases that involve issues that appear to be entrusted to political actors.239 Here, 
too, the Court intermingles the purposes and contours of standing doctrine and the 
political question doctrine, muddling both in the process.240 By pulling them apart, a 
more coherent pair of structural principles could result.  
As discussed above, standing doctrine deprives a federal court of jurisdiction if 
the question involved does not present a case or controversy.241 This ensures that the 
judicial power is only exercised to resolve genuine disputes.242 If a case presents a 
cognizable injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly 
traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling,” then the 
court has the constitutional authority to decide the case and the standing inquiry is at 
an end.243  
Another variant of the political question doctrine—the “political finality” 
doctrine244—reflects a narrower proposition: that a court should treat certain factual 
determinations (or decisions regarding mixed questions of fact and law) made by the 
political branches as conclusive in the course of resolving a case before it.245 In other 
words, the courts may defer to the political branches to decide particular issues within 
a case, but then go on to adjudicate the case.  
As Professor Tara Leigh Grove has shown, this approach reflects the “traditional 
political question doctrine” that was consistently applied by courts during the 
nineteenth century in political question cases.246 These cases did not treat 
justiciability as a matter of Article III jurisdiction247 and did not dismiss 
constitutional claims (let alone whole categories of cases) as nonjusticiable.248 
According to Grove, these historical “political questions” were not constitutional 
questions at all.249 Instead, they were (what lawyers then viewed 
as) factual determinations made by the political branches that courts treated as 
conclusive in the course of deciding cases.250 
 
 
 239. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849); Walter Nixon, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 240. See infra Sections III.A, III.B. 
 241. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)). 
 242. See supra Section II.A. 
 243. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010). 
 244. Professor Harrison refers to this concept as “non-judicial finality,” see Harrison, supra 
note 3, at 504, and Professor Grove refers to it as the “traditional political question doctrine,” 
see Grove, supra note 3, at 1911. I will refer to the concept as the “political finality doctrine” 
throughout. 
 245. See Grove, supra note 3, at 1911, 1918; Harrison, supra note 3, at 461–68. 
 246. Grove, supra note 3, at 1911–15. 
 247. Id. at 1911. 
 248. Id. at 1912. 
 249. Id. at 1915–24. 
 250. Id. The courts’ treatment of such political questions actually was “categorical” in one 
sense—the political determination of the issue was considered binding on all federal and state 
courts. See id. at 1939, 1945–48, 1967–69. This treatment does not track the categorical 
concept deployed today under the modern political question doctrine (i.e., placing whole 
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Distinguishing how standing doctrine and the political finality doctrine intersect 
with federal courts’ decisional authority over cases and within cases would allow 
federal courts to engage with political actors in a more nuanced and principled 
manner. 
A. Standing Doctrine—Injury in Fact  
(Absence of Article III Jurisdiction Over a Case) 
Article III of the Constitution vests the “judicial Power” in the federal courts but 
limits that judicial power to resolving “Cases” and “Controversies.”251 As the 
Supreme Court has observed, the judicial power “cannot be defined, and indeed has 
no substance, without reference to the necessity ‘to adjudge the legal rights of 
litigants in actual controversies.’”252 
Standing doctrine is chiefly concerned with ensuring that the party before the 
court presents a genuine case or controversy and preventing the federal courts from 
resolving abstract questions of law.253 The elements of standing are designed to serve 
this purpose and “assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be 
resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual 
context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial 
action.”254  
As malleable and indeterminate as standing may be,255 its doctrinal framework is 
relatively stable, its purposes are fairly clear, and its jurisdictional effect is tied to a 
distinct constitutional concept, that of requiring a case or controversy.256 The modern 
political question doctrine, on the other hand, parrots standing doctrine in ways that 
add nothing to the constitutional arsenal and undermines standing doctrine in ways 
that cannot be justified by Article III. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Supreme 
Court’s most prominent political-gerrymandering cases: Vieth v. Jubelirer,257 Gill v. 
Whitford,258 and Rucho v. Common Cause.259 
 In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Supreme Court faced a partisan-gerrymandering 
challenge to Pennsylvania’s congressional redistricting plan.260 Across a plurality 
opinion, a concurring opinion, and three separate dissents, all of the Justices assumed 
that partisan gerrymandering could violate the Constitution,261 and a majority 
 
 
categories of constitutional claims or cases beyond judicial cognizance). 
 251. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 252. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 
U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y.C. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 
113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)). 
 253. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223 (1974). 
 254. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472. 
 255. See, e.g., Fallon, Justiciability and Remedies, supra note 109, at 634–35, 634–35 
nn.1–2 (collecting commentary on how standing decisions are influenced by—or are 
functionally equivalent to—judgments about the merits). 
 256. See supra text accompanying notes 103–112, 251–254.  
 257. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 258. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
 259. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 260. 541 U.S. at 271 (plurality opinion). 
 261. See id. at 293 (plurality opinion); id. at 316–17 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 326 
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assumed that the difficulty of fashioning a standard risked rendering such claims 
“nonjusticiable” and beyond judicial review.262 
According to the plurality, the second Baker factor—the existence of a judicially 
discoverable and manageable standard—posed the central question of the case.263 If 
the Court deemed it “impossible” to articulate a judicially manageable standard, then 
Article III would deny judges “the power—and duty—to control political 
gerrymandering.”264 This holding would categorically “foreclose all possibility of 
judicial relief” in political-gerrymandering cases across the board,265 and leave 
legislators forevermore to be the sole judges of their own constitutional violations. 
In assuming this framing of the debate, most of the Justices based their analyses 
on a modern view of the political question doctrine without ever stopping to ask 
whether its categorical approach to jurisdiction setting was reconcilable with the very 
separation of powers principles it was supposed to protect. After all, Vieth did not 
interpret any constitutional provision to foreclose the judicial power to adjudicate 
partisan-gerrymandering claims;266 rather, the plurality purported to foreclose an 
entire category of future, hypothetical claims from judicial review based on facts, 
legal theories, and arguments not before it.267 
This is precisely the kind of sweeping and abstract constitutional pontification 
that standing doctrine is designed to prevent.268 Rather than asking a narrow, 
substantive question posed in a discrete case (whether the Constitution assigns the 
resolution of an issue before the Court in the case at hand to a coordinate branch), 
the modern doctrine asks a broad, abstract question untethered to any specific case 
(whether it is theoretically “impossible” to craft a standard to identify political 
gerrymandering violations). 
The Vieth plurality starts out uncontroversially enough, noting that “judicial 
action must be governed by standard”269 and analyzing each test proposed, raising 
tailored critiques for each.270 So far, this is routine judicial fare. From here, however, 
the Court takes a large and illogical leap, theorizing that its objections reveal 
 
 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 346–53 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 360–62 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 262. Id. at 281 (plurality opinion); id. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 263. Id. at 278 (“The second [factor] is at issue here . . . .”). It is worth noting that although 
Justice Scalia discussed Congress’s power under Article I to regulate congressional 
redistricting, see id. at 274–77, he did not argue that this satisfied Baker’s first factor. Instead, 
he focused specifically on Baker’s second factor. See id. at 278; see also Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 
2498 (observing that the Vieth plurality “would have held that the plaintiffs’ claims were 
nonjusticiable because there was no ‘judicially discernible and manageable standard’ for 
deciding them”). The likely reasons for this focus on manageability are discussed below. See 
infra text accompanying notes 381–397. 
 264. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277–78. 
 265. Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 266. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
 267. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281–306 (setting out reasons why partisan gerrymandering is not 
amenable to judicially manageable standards). 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 253–254. 
 269. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (emphasis in original) (“[L]aw pronounced by the courts must 
be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”). 
 270. See id. at 281–305. 
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political-gerrymandering claims to be intrinsically incapable of resolution by 
judicially manageable standards.271 
As Justice Kennedy responds in his concurrence, “[r]elying on the distinction 
between a claim having or not having a workable standard . . . hinges entirely on 
proof that no standard could exist.”272 This is a conclusion the plurality had not and 
could not demonstrate. To hold it was “impossible to assess the effects of partisan 
gerrymandering, to fashion a standard for evaluating a violation, and finally to craft 
a remedy”273 required the Court to reach beyond the confines of Article III and opine 
about factual circumstances and legal arguments not before it.274 
In attempting to respond to Justice Kennedy’s argument, Justice Scalia raises 
three examples that unintentionally reveal the modern doctrine’s fundamental flaw: 
rather than interpreting the Constitution to decide if judicial action itself would be 
unlawful, the doctrine inverts the inquiry. 275 The Court instead asks if judicial action 
seems inappropriate as a matter of prudence to determine whether it will interpret the 
Constitution at all.276  
First, Justice Scalia invokes the Justices’ July 18, 1793, letter to President 
Washington declining to render legal advice on the meaning of treaties the United 
States was party to.277 Justice Scalia notes that the Justices responded in a 
“categorical” manner, “saying that the giving of advisory opinions—not just 
advisory opinions on particular questions but all advisory opinions . . .—was beyond 
their power.”278  
But nothing in the Justices’ letter suggests they declined Washington’s invitation 
because they thought it “impossible” to come up with a standard for determining 
when advisory opinions might be appropriate or because they thought it might reflect 
poorly on the Court.279 As Justice Scalia himself recognizes in Vieth, the Justices 
 
 
 271. See id. at 281, 305–06. 
 272. Id. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 273. Id. at 287 (plurality opinion). 
 274. See id. (opining without record evidence about the discernibility of political 
affiliation, stating that “[w]e dare say (and hope) that the political party which puts forward 
an utterly incompetent candidate will lose even in its registration stronghold,” and claiming 
that “[t]hese facts make it impossible to assess the effects of partisan gerrymandering, to 
fashion a standard for evaluating a violation, and finally to craft a remedy”).  
 275. See id. at 302–03. 
 276. See supra text accompanying notes 32–64. 
 277. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 302. 
 278. Id. 
 279. See generally Letter from Chief-Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President 
Washington (July 20, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 
1782-1793, at 487–88 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1891).  
 Nor can it be said to be inherently impossible to craft a standard for determining when—
and under what conditions—an advisory opinion might be permissible or appropriate. The 
Maine Constitution, for example, states: “The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court shall be 
obliged to give their opinion upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions, 
when required by the Governor, Senate or House of Representatives.” ME. CONST. art. VI, § 
3. Accordingly, the Justices of Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court have developed “guideposts” 
to ascertain when a “solemn occasion” exists and to “assure that [they] do not overstep [their] 
bounds.” See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 162 A.3d 188, 201–04 (Me. 2017). If the Justices 
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who wrote the letter to Washington interpreted the Constitution to forbid them from 
offering advisory opinions.280 And, federal courts across the country continue to 
engage in this interpretive exercise on a case-by-case basis whenever they apply 
standing doctrine. As the Justices wrote, “[t]he lines of separation drawn by the 
Constitution between the three departments of the government” and “the power given 
by the Constitution to the President, of calling on the heads of departments for 
opinions” meant that the Court was forbidden from offering extrajudicial legal 
guidance.281 The Justices determined this was so despite the fact that such a decision 
“may cause embarrassment to your administration.”282 
Second, Justice Scalia cites Gilligan v. Morgan283 for the proposition that the 
Court “held [a] suit nonjusticiable . . . because, inter alia, ‘it is difficult to conceive 
of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence.’”284 
According to Justice Scalia, the Court “did not adopt the more ‘cautious’ course of 
letting the lower courts try their hand at regulating the military before we declared it 
impossible.”285  
But, again, the Gilligan Court did not declare constitutional violations by the 
National Guard categorically unamenable to equitable remedy, let alone on the sole 
basis that doing so was “impossible.”286 The Gilligan Court held that overseeing the 
normal operations of the military is a task committed to the political branches, that 
courts may not displace that role, and that no justiciable controversy was presented 
in that specific case.287 The Court’s “competence” concerns provided additional 
functional reasons to validate its largely textual interpretation of the Constitution’s 
allocation of roles. And, contrary to Justice Scalia’s characterization,288 the Gilligan 
Court explicitly qualified the reach of its holding, stating that a court could enjoin 
the military from “specified and imminently threatened unlawful action” were such 
a case to arise.289 
Third, Justice Scalia points to Walter Nixon v. United States290 for the proposition 
that the Court can never review “a claim that the Senate ha[s] employed certain 
impermissible procedures in trying an impeachment.”291 As an initial matter, this 
objection has the same flaw as the first: the Court did not hold that impeachment 
 
 
had interpreted cases or controversies to include disputes over important advisory questions, 
a standard would have surely emerged and developed over time, just as standing doctrine has 
developed over time. 
 280. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 302. 
 281. Letter from Chief-Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington (Aug. 
8, 1793), in 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, supra note 279, at 488. 
 282. Id. at 489. 
 283. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 284. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 303 (quoting Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10). 
 285. Id. at 303.  
 286. See supra text accompanying notes 202–205. 
 287. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 11–12. 
 288. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 302 (“When it has come to determining what areas fall beyond our 
Article III authority to adjudicate, this Court’s practice, from the earliest days of the Republic 
to the present, has been more reminiscent of Hannibal than of Hamlet.”). 
 289. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 5. 
 290. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 291. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 303. 
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procedures were unamenable to judicial review solely on the basis that such review 
would be “unmanageable.”292 The Nixon Court examined the text, structure, and 
history of the Constitution and relied heavily upon its unusually explicit assignment 
of a traditionally judicial function to a political actor: the “Power to try all 
Impeachments.”293  
More importantly, scholars rightfully critiqued the Nixon decision for sweeping 
far broader than necessary to resolve the case.294 The Court could have found the 
issue outside its constitutional authority based on a deferential substantive 
interpretation in the case at hand and did not need to deploy a categorical 
jurisdictional exclusion.295 Such an approach would have had a similar result without 
tacitly precommitting the Court to absurd results.296  
Regardless, none of the examples cited by Justice Scalia were based solely upon 
speculation that developing judicially manageable standards would be “impossible.” 
In each case the Court looked to the meaning of the Constitution to guide its decision, 
and in each case the most helpful guide to that meaning was the text itself.297  
Making an abstract judgment about the “impossibility” of standards, on the other 
hand, necessarily purports to reach cases, circumstances, facts, and arguments 
beyond those presented by the case before the Court,298 contrary to the limits imposed 
on judicial power by Article III.299  
 
 
 292. The Nixon majority did conclude “that the use of the word ‘try’ in the first sentence 
of the Impeachment Trial Clause lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable 
standard of review,” 506 U.S. at 230, but the Court did not rest its holding on this argument 
alone, see id. at 228–38. Justice White rightfully takes the majority to task for this: “One might 
think that if any class of concepts would fall within the definitional abilities of the Judiciary, 
it would be that class having to do with procedural justice.” Id. at 248 (White, J., concurring). 
 293. See id. at 229–38 (interpreting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6). 
 294. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The 
Other Nixon v. United States, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 125 (1993). 
 295. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 39, at 454–55 (noting that the Court could have decided 
on the merits to allow Congress to adopt any interpretation of the word “try” so long as that 
interpretation was rational). 
 296. See Walter Nixon, 506 U.S. at 246 (White, J., concurring) (noting that even the 
Government itself conceded that the Senate would fail to “try” an impeachment if it “adopt[ed] 
the practice of automatically entering a judgment of conviction whenever articles of 
impeachment were delivered from the House”); id. at 252–54 (Souter, J., concurring) (“I agree 
with the Court that this case presents a nonjusticiable political question. . . . One can, 
nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching 
review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously 
threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, . . . judicial interference 
might well by appropriate.”). 
 297. See supra text accompanying notes 277–293. 
 298. See Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Householder, 373 F. Supp. 3d 978, 1080 (S.D. 
Ohio 2019), vacated and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 101 (2019) (“[I]f courts were to rely solely on 
the lack of a judicially manageable standard to conclude that an issue qualifies as a political 
question, then courts would be opining on the manageability of standards not involved in the 
case at hand. That would be imprudent because a court can dispose of only the matters in a 
case currently before it . . . .”). 
 299. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 
U.S. 464, 472 (1982). 
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If plaintiffs fail to provide an adequate way for the Court to identify a 
particularized and concrete constitutional injury, the course “legally available” to the 
Court is to “adjudicate only what is in the papers before [it]”300 and to hold that the 
plaintiffs lack Article III standing.301 
To its credit, this is precisely what the Court did in Gill v. Whitford.302 In Gill, the 
Supreme Court reviewed a statewide challenge to Wisconsin’s state legislative 
plan.303 The plaintiffs alleged that the plan was so egregiously skewed to favor 
Republicans that it violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.304 To gauge this asymmetry, the plaintiffs provided a metric—the 
efficiency gap—that would allow the Court to measure the adverse impact that the 
plan had on Democrats’ ability to convert votes into legislative seats.305 The plaintiffs 
contended that “an efficiency gap in the range of 7% to 10% should trigger 
constitutional scrutiny.”306 
The Court vacated and remanded the case, unanimously holding that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing to allege a statewide injury.307 Although the Court explicitly declined 
to answer whether partisan-gerrymandering claims were justiciable,308 it 
simultaneously ported some arguments identified in Vieth from judicial-
manageability grounds to standing grounds. 
In Vieth, for example, Justice Scalia objected to the plaintiffs’ effects test, which 
required court intervention when a map “thwart[s] the . . . ability to translate a 
majority of votes into a majority of seats.”309 Justice Scalia opined that statewide 
analyses are not judicially manageable because “[p]olitical parties do not compete 
for the highest statewide vote totals or the highest mean district vote percentages: 
They compete for specific seats.”310 He also observed that “political groups that tend 
to cluster (as is the case with Democratic voters in cities)” may have their voting 
power diluted by “what might be called a ‘natural’ packing effect” apart from any 
partisan objectives.311 This too, Justice Scalia argued, made judicial review an 
impossible undertaking for courts. 
In Gill, a unanimous Court rejected plaintiffs’ effects test for similar reasons but 
on different grounds.312 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts observed that 
statewide asymmetry measures reveal “the effect that a gerrymander has on the 
 
 
 300. Compare Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 301 (2004) (plurality opinion), with id. at 
313 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 301. See infra text accompanying notes 302–320 (discussing the Court’s approach in Gill 
v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018)). 
 302. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
 303. Id. at 1923–24. 
 304. Id. at 1924. 
 305. Id. at 1933. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 1933–34. 
 308. Id. at 1929. 
 309. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 268 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 310. Id. at 289 (quoting Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for 
Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1,            
60 (1985)). 
 311. Id. at 290. 
 312. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1933–34. 
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fortunes of political parties,” but not “the effect that a gerrymander has on the votes 
of particular citizens.”313 This meant the plaintiffs were not measuring a relevant 
injury for standing. Chief Justice Roberts also pointed to one plaintiff in particular—
William Whitford—who lived in a district where “Democrats are ‘naturally’ packed 
due to their geographic concentration.”314 As the Chief Justice noted, “even 
plaintiffs’ own demonstration map resulted in a virtually identical district for him.”315  
To demonstrate the cognizable constitutional harm of individual partisan vote 
dilution, a plaintiff would need to show that “the particular composition of the voter’s 
own district . . . cause[d] his vote . . . to carry less weight than it would carry in 
another, hypothetical district.”316 Because a “single statewide measure of partisan 
advantage”317 did not identify how gerrymandering affected the plaintiffs in this kind 
of “personal and individual way,”318 they could not demonstrate Article III 
standing.319 
Unlike the categorical political question decision that the Vieth plurality would 
have made regarding a whole class of hypothetical cases, the Gill decision rested its 
standing decision “on the understanding that [the Court] lack[ed] jurisdiction to 
decide [the case before it], much less to draw speculative and advisory conclusions 
regarding others.”320 The Gill opinion rightly limited itself to the specific facts, legal 
arguments, and perceived shortcomings of the specific case before it.  
Gill’s careful and considered reliance on standing doctrine makes Chief Justice 
Roberts’ sweeping decision in Rucho v. Common Cause all the more surprising. In 
Rucho, the Court faced a congressional map drawn with the indisputable purpose of 
conferring partisan advantage,321 and the plaintiffs brought district-specific partisan-
gerrymandering claims that demonstrated how the vote split in their individual 
districts compared to thousands of hypothetical alternative districts in which they 
might have been placed in the absence of the pursuit of partisan advantage.322 In 
 
 
 313. Id. at 1933. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. at 1931. 
 317. Id. at 1933. 
 318. Id. at 1929 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992)). 
 319. Gill is somewhat unclear whether the issue for naturally packed plaintiffs is truly a 
problem of injury in fact or rather a problem of traceability. Compare id. at 1933 (stating that 
“the fundamental problem” is that plaintiff’s case is “about group political interests, not 
individual legal rights”), with id. at 1924 (noting that Whitford “acknowledged . . . that [his 
district] is, under any plausible circumstances, a heavily Democratic district.”) (emphasis 
added), and id. at 1933 (noting that, “[b]y all accounts, Act 43 [did] not affec[t] Whitford’s 
individual vote”) (emphasis added).  
 320. Id. at 1931. 
 321. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019). North Carolina General 
Assembly’s redistricting committee adopted criteria that included a provision—subtly titled 
“Partisan Advantage”—that expressly required the creation of a map that would elect 10 
Republicans and 3 Democrats. Id. at 2510 (Kagan, J., dissenting). One of the committee 
members explained these numbers were chosen because he “d[id] not believe [it was] possible 
to draw a map with 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats.” Id.  
 322. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 893–94 (M.D.N.C. 2018), 
vacated and remanded, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
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short, the Rucho plaintiffs provided precisely the evidence that the unanimous Court 
in Gill had requested: a measure to show that the particular composition of individual 
voters’ districts caused their votes to carry less weight than they would carry in 
districts not drawn for the purpose of partisan advantage. 
Nonetheless, Rucho lurches away from the standing-driven and case-limited 
conception of judicial power expressed in Gill. Rucho (1) relies upon arguments 
presented in Gill as posing standing problems, (2) cites to standing case law, and (3) 
ignores the implications of standing doctrine for the justiciability question posed by 
the case.323 
First, Rucho abandons the progress made in Gill. Whereas Gill moved some of 
Vieth’s objections from abstract political question grounds to constitutional and case-
specific standing grounds, Rucho engages in the opposite exercise. Consider Rucho’s 
objection that partisan-gerrymandering claims “invariably sound in a desire for 
proportional representation” and “rest on an instinct that groups with a certain level 
of political support should enjoy a commensurate level of political power and 
influence.”324 Apart from the fact that these statements are demonstrably false,325 
they raise objections that were already framed in Gill as presenting a barrier to 
standing.  
In Gill, the Court observed that challenges to the overall allocation of political 
power by a redistricting map assert only a “generalized grievance” rather than an 
individual harm.326 Thus, litigants were apprised that any future claim must sound in 
individual harm and any claim that raised the kind of “generalized grievances” at 
issue in Gill would likely be dismissed for lack of standing.327  
In response, the Rucho plaintiffs presented theories, arguments, and evidence 
rooted in individual harm.328 Rather than engaging with the showing in the case 
before it, however, the Court moved its objections back to political question grounds, 
freeing the majority to make abstract, incorrect, and now-unchallengeable assertions 
about the intrinsic nature of “all” partisan-gerrymandering claims (rather than 
leaving future decisions to test new theories or new facts).329  
Second, Rucho further blurs the line between standing doctrine and the political 
question doctrine by relying almost solely upon standing case law to establish the 
relevant jurisdictional standard.330 Just as Allen v. Wright inappropriately expanded 
standing doctrine to cover political question purposes,331 Rucho parrots standing’s 
purposes in an attempt to manufacture a passable doctrinal veneer for identifying 
political questions.332 Chief Justice Roberts cites Flast v. Cohen for the proposition 
that “federal courts can address only questions ‘historically viewed as capable of 
 
 
 323. See infra text accompanying notes 324–339. 
 324. 139 S. Ct. at 2499. 
 325. See infra text accompanying notes 535–546. 
 326. Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930, 1931, 1933 (2018). 
 327. Id. at 1932. 
 328. See supra text accompanying note 322; infra text accompanying notes 535–537. 
 329. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499, 2501. 
 330. See id. at 2494. 
 331. See supra text accompanying notes 128–140. 
 332. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2493–94. 
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resolution through the judicial process’”333 and DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno for 
the requirement that the questions “presented in a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’” be “of a 
Judiciary Nature.”334 But Flast and DaimlerChrysler are cases on standing.335  
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts raises this standing case law but then ignores its 
implications. To the extent Flast and DaimlerChrysler do any relevant jurisdictional 
gatekeeping, their role was already settled in Gill: determining whether individual 
partisan vote dilution qualifies as a cognizable constitutional harm sufficient to 
generate a case or controversy under Article III.336 On this question, the Gill Court 
unanimously agreed: yes, partisan vote dilution can constitute a cognizable harm 
sufficient to satisfy Article III if the plaintiff can show that packing or cracking 
caused his vote to carry less weight than it would in another, hypothetical district.337 
In short, if “judicial manageability” means only that a question was “historically 
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process,”338 then political 
question doctrine extends no further than standing doctrine and Rucho could not 
render nonjusticiable that which Gill had already deemed cognizable. If, on the other 
hand, “judicial manageability” means that generating legal standards is “impossible,” 
then the political question doctrine demands precisely what Article III prohibits: 
opining about cases and controversies not before the Court.339  
Thus, the modern political question doctrine serves no independent jurisdictional 
purpose that standing doctrine does not better serve and undermines the purposes that 
the Court ascribes to Article III’s case or controversy language.  
B. The Political Finality Doctrine  
(Conflicting Constitutional Authority to Decide Issues Within a Case) 
The political finality doctrine340 requires a court to treat certain factual 
determinations (or decisions regarding mixed questions of fact and law) made by the 
political branches as conclusive in the course of resolving a case before it.341 This 
 
 
 333. Id. at 2493–94 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)). 
 334. Id. 2494 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006)). 
 335. See DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 342 (“[B]efore we [decide the constitutional 
question], we must find that the question is presented in a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ that is, in 
James Madison’s words, ‘of a Judiciary Nature.’ That requires plaintiffs, as the parties now 
asserting federal jurisdiction, to carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article 
III.” (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911)) (emphasis added)); Flast, 392 U.S. at 98–101. 
 336. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929–31 (2018). 
 337. See id. at 1931; id. at 1934 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 338. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2393–94 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 95). 
 339. See infra text accompanying notes 539–546 (discussing how Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 
makes abstract and false statements about both the partisan gerrymandering claims before it 
and partisan gerrymandering claims in general); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 
292–301 (2004) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that the absence of a standard that the Court 
was willing to accept in the case at hand meant that standards were inherently impossible to 
generate). 
 340. Professor Grove calls this the “traditional political question doctrine”; Professor 
Harrison refers to this as “non-judicial finality.” See supra notes 244–245. 
 341. Grove, supra note 3, at 1911, 1918.  
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doctrine arises only when a political decision-maker is empowered by the 
Constitution to exercise a function that might traditionally be considered 
adjudicatory: deciding an issue raised within a case before the judiciary with final 
binding effect.342  
In such situations, the court attributes nonjudicial finality343 only to the resolution 
of the discrete nonjusticiable issue “and then [goes] on to resolve [any] remaining 
factual and legal issues in the case.”344 Like the political remedies doctrine, the 
political finality doctrine does not operate as a jurisdictional bar. “[A] court can have 
jurisdiction to decide a case that turns on [a] nonjusticiab[le] [issue] . . . .”345 For 
example, “[w]hen a plaintiff with a meritorious claim relies on the political branches’ 
recognition of a foreign government, . . . the [political finality] doctrine underlies 
part of the court’s reasoning in a successful suit.”346 
Professor Grove makes precisely this point in discussing Luther v. Borden.347 
There, Borden broke into Luther’s house to arrest him for unlawfully supporting a 
rebellion group that claimed it was the new, legitimate government of Rhode 
Island.348 Luther sued Borden for trespass, and Borden defended himself by saying 
he was acting on behalf of the existing charter government, which had imposed 
martial law.349 Luther argued that the charter government was not the true 
government of the state.350 The Court held that it would accept Congress’s 
determination on this question (which government controlled Rhode Island) as 
conclusive.351 Yet, as Professor Grove notes, “[t]he Court then went on to decide the 
major legal issue in the case: whether the charter government was justified in 
declaring martial law during the [rebellion].”352 
More recently, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I)353 and Zivotofsky v. Kerry 
(Zivotofsky II),354 the Supreme Court employed a somewhat similar approach, 
treating a decision by a political actor regarding a political question as conclusive 
within a case. Zivotofsky I & II involved a conflict between Congress and the 
President over the political status of Israel. Congress enacted a law requiring the 
Secretary of State, upon the request of a citizen born in Jerusalem, to record the place 
of birth in his or her passport as “Israel.”355 The State Department’s own internal 
 
 
 342. Harrison, supra note 3, at 505. 
 343. See id. at 460. 
 344. Grove, supra note 3, at 1923; see also Harrison, supra note 3, at 468, 487.  
 345. Harrison, supra note 3, at 496. 
 346. Id.; see also id. at 500–01, 504 (discussing Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 
(1854)). 
 347. Grove, supra note 3, at 1924–28 (discussing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 
(1849)). 
 348. Luther, 48 U.S. at 34–38. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at 42, 47. 
 352. Grove, supra note 3, at 1927. 
 353. 566 U.S. 189 (2012). 
 354. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 355. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 191. 
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rules, however, directed passport officials to record “Jerusalem” and “not write Israel 
or Jordan” when recording the citizen’s birthplace on their passport.356  
The Court retained jurisdiction over the case, holding that the task before it did 
not entail answering a political question (“to decide the political status of 
Jerusalem”),357 but rather a legal one (“[to] decide . . . whether the statute is 
constitutional”).358 After interpreting the Constitution to determine which branch—
Congress or the President—should be entrusted with the resolution of the political 
question,359 the Court would then treat the proper political branch’s decision as 
conclusive with respect to the nonjusticiable political issue and go on to resolve       
the case.360  
If the statute “impermissibly intrudes upon Presidential powers under the 
Constitution,” then “the law must be invalidated and Zivotofsky’s case should be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim.”361 But if the law “does not trench on the 
President’s powers, then the Secretary must be ordered to issue Zivotofsky a passport 
that complies with [that law].”362  
Using its normal tools of constitutional interpretation, the Court eventually went 
on to decide that the President should be entrusted with the finality decision.363 
Unsurprisingly, some factors it considered were akin to the Baker factors. Although 
the Constitution did not contain an explicit textual commitment of the recognition 
power to the Executive,364 the Court interpreted the Constitution to entrust this 
function exclusively to the President.365 In so interpreting, the Court relied on the 
textual commitment of related functions and powers,366 the difficulty Congress 
would have in “tak[ing] the decisive, unequivocal action necessary,”367 the need for 
the President’s decision to be “conclusive” and “obligatory on the people and 
government of the Union,”368 and the importance of the nation speaking with one 
voice in foreign affairs.369  
 
 
 356. Id. at 192. 
 357. Id. at 195 (quoting Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103 (D.D.C. 
2007), vacated and remanded, 566 U.S. 189 (2012)). 
 358. Id. at 196. 
 359. See id. at 196–202.  
 360. See id. at 196; see also Grove, supra note 3, at 1923; Harrison, supra note 3, at         
468, 487.  
 361. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 196. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2080 (2015). 
 364. Id. at 2084–85 (“Despite the importance of the recognition power in foreign relations, 
the Constitution does not use the term ‘recognition,’ either in Article II or elsewhere.”). 
 365. Id. at 2088. 
 366. See id. at 2084–86. Compare id., with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) 
(discussing importance of “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue”). 
 367. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2086.  
 368. Id. at 2088. Compare id., with Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (discussing importance of “an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made”). 
 369. See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 
396, 424 (2003)). Compare id., with Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (discussing “the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”). 
2020] GERRYMANDERING & JUSTICIABILITY  1335 
 
The political finality doctrine operates in just this manner. To determine whether 
a nonjusticiable political issue has been raised in a case (and whether finality should 
be attributed to the political branches’ resolution of that issue rather than the judicial 
branch’s), a court must examine “the textual, structural, and historical evidence put 
forward by the parties”370 to “look[] for indicia that a political actor has been given 
authority to apply law to fact conclusively.”371 As Chief Justice Roberts succinctly 
stated in Zivotofsky I, “This is what courts do.”372  
Using such “familiar principles of constitutional interpretation . . . is enough to 
establish that [a] case does not ‘turn on standards that defy judicial application.’”373 
Rather than being independent jurisdictional tests, the Baker factors simply provide 
“indicators that a political actor [should have] the last word in the application of law 
to fact”374 within the context of a given case.375 Whatever textual, historical, or 
functional factors the Court relies upon, however, the reason for deferring to a 
political decision (or declining to do so) constitutes a substantive exercise in 
constitutional interpretation.376  
In applying the doctrine, however, the Court must remember that “[b]eing held to 
a rule and being called on to determine whether it has been violated are very different 
functions.”377 The political finality doctrine is not applicable in many of the cases 
where the modern doctrine is thought to apply—namely, cases in which government 
decision-makers are the ones subject to liability.378 “[P]otential tortfeasors do not 
 
 
 370. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012). 
 371. Harrison, supra note 3, at 518. 
 372. 566 U.S. at 201. 
 373. Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211). 
 374. Harrison, supra note 3, at 498. 
 375. The political finality doctrine also provides an analytical framework that 
complements another one of the Court’s most puzzling separation of powers problems: the 
meaning of United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). The political finality 
doctrine implicitly recognizes that there may be times when political actors attempt to decide 
dispositive issues within cases without indicia that doing so is consistent with their 
constitutional function. Chief Justice Roberts posits a hypothetical of this nature in Bank 
Markazi v. Peterson:  
Imagine your neighbor sues you, claiming that your fence is on his property. His 
evidence is a letter from the previous owner of your home, accepting your 
neighbor’s version of the facts. Your defense is an official county map, which 
under state law establishes the boundaries of your land. The map shows the fence 
on your side of the property line. You also argue that your neighbor’s claim is 
six months outside the statute of limitations. 
     Now imagine that while the lawsuit is pending, your neighbor persuades the 
legislature to enact a new statute. The new statute provides that for your case, 
and your case alone, a letter from one neighbor to another is conclusive of 
property boundaries, and the statute of limitations is one year longer. Your 
neighbor wins. Who would you say decided your case: the legislature, which 
targeted your specific case and eliminated your specific defenses so as to ensure 
your neighbor’s victory, or the court, which presided over the fait accompli? 
136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 376. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. 
 377. Harrison, supra note 3, at 518. 
 378. Id. 
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conclusively decide whether they have committed a tort.”379 The political finality 
doctrine does not make political actors judges in their own cause. 
* * * 
Gerrymandering helps illustrate the meaning and potential application of the 
political finality doctrine. Both Chief Justice Roberts (in Rucho) and Justice Scalia 
(in Vieth) raised the history, text, and function of the Elections Clause380 in their 
respective gerrymandering cases,381 yet neither claimed that the Elections Clause 
could provide the basis for holding partisan-gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable.382 
Instead, both rested their holdings on the supposed “unmanageability” of such 
claims.383 Why? 
The political finality doctrine reveals why the “Elections Clause justification” for 
nonjusticiability fails: the Elections Clause itself does not entrust a relevant “issue” 
to a political actor or provide a relevant “political decision” for federal courts to apply 
on the merits in the course of resolving the constitutional claim entrusted to them to 
decide. The question in Rucho was whether partisan gerrymandering violates the 
First or Fourteenth Amendments. The answer to that question would place 
constitutional limits on legislative redistricting decisions by state or federal actors. 
The Elections Clause says nothing about that constitutional question.  
First, the history of the Elections Clause fails to offer dispositive guidance. As 
Rucho recounts, the practice of gerrymandering “was known in the Colonies prior to 
Independence” and made an appearance in the first congressional elections ever, with 
Patrick Henry attempting to gerrymander a Virginia district to favor James Monroe 
over James Madison.384 And during the ratification debates over electoral districting 
there was “[no] suggestion that the federal courts had a role to play.”385 
 
 
 379. Id. 
 380. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 381. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494–96 (2019); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
541 U.S. 267, 274–77 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 382. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495–96 (“[T]he Elections Clause [does not] . . . set aside 
[political-gerrymandering claims] as questions that only Congress can resolve. . . . But the 
history is not irrelevant.”); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 275 (“It is significant that the Framers provided 
a remedy for such practices in the Constitution.”). 
 383. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (“Among the political question cases this Court has 
identified are those that lack ‘judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
[them].’ . . . The question here is whether [partisan-gerrymandering claims] are claims of legal 
right, resolvable according to legal principles, or political questions that must find their 
resolution elsewhere.” (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962))); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277–78 (“In Baker v. Carr, we set forth six 
independent tests for the existence of a political question . . . . The second is at issue here . . . .” 
(citation omitted)).  
 384. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494. It is perhaps more accurate to say that “gerrymandering”—
rather than “partisan gerrymandering”—was familiar to the Framers. The Framers notably 
failed to anticipate the rise and power of political parties in the constitutional system they had 
devised.  
 385. Id. at 2496. 
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But the ratification history of the Elections Clause predates the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. As Chief Justice Roberts acknowledges, the Supreme 
Court went on to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to impose constitutional limits 
on redistricting practices such as quantitative vote dilution and racial 
gerrymandering.386 Asked to hold that the history of the Elections Clause definitively 
sets aside issues such as partisan gerrymandering as “questions that only Congress 
can resolve,” the Rucho majority rightfully offers a firm and plain response: “[w]e 
do not agree.”387  
Second, consider the text and structure of the Elections Clause. The Clause 
“assigns to state legislatures the power to prescribe the ‘Times, Places and Manner 
of holding Elections’ for Members of Congress, while giving Congress the power to 
‘make or alter’ any such regulations.”388 That Congress has the power to set standards 
for state legislatures conducting congressional redistricting or even the power to 
conduct congressional redistricting itself via the Elections Clause has no bearing on 
whether the First Amendment or Equal Protection Clause impose separate, outside 
constraints on the exercise of that power (either by state legislatures or by Congress). 
For example, how could an interpretation of the Elections Clause strip jurisdiction 
from federal courts with respect to gerrymandering of state legislative districts 
(which Congress cannot regulate via the Elections Clause)?389 Rucho does not say.  
 
 
 386. See id. 
 387. Id. at 2495.  
 388. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1).  
 389. See Derek T. Muller, Politics as Usual, PUB. DISCOURSE (July 7, 2019), 
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2019/07/54460/ [https://perma.cc/3T78-FFLY]. 
 That Congress cannot regulate state legislative redistricting via the Elections Clause does 
not necessarily mean that Congress cannot regulate state legislative redistricting at all—only 
that the Elections Clause cannot provide the vehicle for doing so. For example, Congress 
might rely upon the Guarantee Clause as a positive source of (currently) unreviewable 
authority for regulating state legislative redistricting. See Matt Ford, Make the Guarantee 
Clause Great Again, NEW REPUBLIC (July 17, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/154486 
/guarantee-clause-hindering-gerrymandering-reform [https://perma.cc/CX55-HW35] 
(observing that Congress could “invoke the clause to forbid state legislatures from enacting 
the kinds of partisan gerrymanders that Rucho now blocks the federal courts from stopping,” 
and that holding such a law unconstitutional would require the Court “to make Guarantee 
Clause claims justiciable again”). 
 Congress might also rely upon its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Rucho does not purport to interpret the Equal Protection Clause 
on the merits. 139 S. Ct. at 2508 (remanding “with instructions to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction”). And a majority of the Court in both Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551, 551 
n.7 (1999), and Rucho recognized a supposed distinction between “constitutional” and 
“unconstitutional” political gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause, 139 S. Ct. at 
2497 (favorably citing Hunt to establish the proposition that legislatures may engage in some 
partisan gerrymandering, thereby making the central justiciability problem one of determining 
when partisan gerrymandering has gone too far). In other words, Hunt and Rucho rest upon 
the assumption that partisan gerrymandering can violate the Equal Protection Clause if it goes 
too far, that the Court is incapable of articulating standards for when partisan gerrymandering 
goes too far, and that it is a distinctly “political question” to decide how far is “too far.” Rucho, 
139 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (2004) (plurality opinion)). 
All of this suggests that Congress might invoke its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
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Third, the text, structure, and operation of the Clause all shed light on its function, 
and the function of the Clause does not preclude judicial review. That is because—
as the political finality doctrine instructs—there is a key difference between an 
actor’s discretion and the application of legal standards to that discretion.390 
It is one thing to subject state legislative power to oversight through federal 
legislative preemption (the function of the Elections Clause). It is another thing 
entirely to preclude state (or even federal) legislative power from federal judicial 
oversight (the function of the judiciary enforcing the First and/or Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
In other words, the question, “Does partisan gerrymandering violate the Equal 
Protection Clause?” is a different question than, “What standard for congressional 
redistricting does Congress prefer?” For one, the answer to the first question places 
a permanent constitutional boundary on the exercise of legislative discretion (by 
federal or state actors), whereas the other constitutes a fluid reflection of that exercise 
of legislative discretion. Nor does a court articulating a constitutional standard usurp 
the federal or state legislative power to articulate statutory redistricting standards. 
Consider an example from Rucho itself: the enforcement of population equality 
under Article I, Section 2 (for congressional districts) and the Fourteenth 
Amendment (for state legislative districts). The Framers were aware at the time of 
ratification of the risk of malapportionment, and the Elections Clause was thought to 
provide Congress a means of protecting against this.391 Congress even exercised this 
power for a period of time, enacting federal statutes that required population equality 
in congressional redistricting.392 Yet, none of that precluded the Court from 
interpreting Article I, Section 2 and the Equal Protection Clause to require population 
equality in congressional and state legislative districts.393 
In a similar vein, Congress’s power to enact the Voting Rights Act under the 
Fifteenth Amendment did not somehow foreclose the Court’s power to adjudicate 
racial-vote-dilution or racial-sorting claims arising under the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments.394 If Congress undertook its own congressional redistricting 
pursuant to the Elections Clause and drew congressional districts with the purpose 
and effect of diluting the electoral influence of racial minorities, no one would 
believe its decisions were exempt from the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments or 
beyond the reach of the federal courts. Nor is there any reason to think that 
Congress’s power to take the lead in drawing its own districts would somehow place 
racial vote dilution by state legislators outside the judicial ken. 
Thus, Congress’s latent power to regulate partisan gerrymandering of 
congressional districts does nothing to foreclose the Court’s power to adjudicate 
partisan-gerrymandering claims arising under the First or Fourteenth 
 
 
authority to articulate how far is “too far.” To declare such a law unconstitutional, the Court 
would need to pass on the merits of the question it held nonjusticiable in Rucho. 
 390. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 518. 
 391. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495.  
 392. Id.  
 393. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 
7–8 (1964). 
 394. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 628 
(1982); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960). 
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Amendments.395 Chief Justice Roberts notes in Rucho that “Congress has regularly 
exercised its Elections Clause power, including to address partisan gerrymandering” 
by enacting (and then repealing) statutory contiguity and compactness 
requirements.396 But that fact neither strengthens nor weakens the conclusion that the 
First or Fourteenth Amendments prohibit partisan gerrymandering. It has no bearing 
on those questions at all. 
Federal legislative preemption and federal judicial review are simply different 
constitutional functions. The Elections Clause does not render federal and state 
election laws immune to judicial review any more than the Commerce Clause renders 
federal and state economic regulations immune to judicial review. The fact that a 
political actor possesses a power does not remove exercises of that power from the 
application of legal standards.397 The Elections Clause is no exception. 
The political finality doctrine also explains why the application of a standard 
prohibiting partisan suppression in redistricting is not tantamount to displacing 
legislative discretion or imposing a singular vision of electoral “fairness.”398 When 
it comes to public-employee hiring, it is a political question to ask what 
characteristics we are looking for in a candidate and how we should balance them in 
light of the candidates available.399 It is a legal question to ask whether the 
government violated the Constitution by discriminating on the basis of political 
preference.400 It is a political question to ask what the best policies and practices are 
for encouraging productivity, quality, and morale. It is a legal question to ask if a 
superior “fail[ed] to hold a birthday party for a public employee . . . to punish her for 
exercising her free speech rights.”401  
Like many areas in which executive and legislative actors operate, there are 
billions of appropriate options available to mapmakers, and selecting among them is 
entrusted to their discretion.402 But the Court does not need a theory of ideal political 
representation or a best map or a “substantive definition of fairness”403 to intervene 
 
 
 395. The Court could have interpreted the First Amendment or Equal Protection Clause 
not to impose any outside limits on partisan vote dilution, but this would be a decision on the 
merits rather than a jurisdictional decision under the modern political question doctrine. 
 396. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495. 
 397. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 518. 
 398. See id. at 483.  
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 400. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). 
 401. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75 n.8 (1990) (quoting Rutan v. 
Republican Party of Ill., 868 F.2d 943, 954 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 
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to defer to the political process in [this] area” out of concerns about “excessive interference 
by the Federal Judiciary.” Id. 
 402. Wendy K. Tam Cho & Yan Y. Liu, Toward a Talismanic Redistricting Tool: A 
Computational Method for Identifying Extreme Redistricting Plans, 15 ELECTION L. J. 351, 
360 (2016) (using supercomputers to generate “more than a billion” comparison maps). 
 403. Contra Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2500 (2019) (“Deciding among . 
. . different visions of fairness . . . poses basic questions that are political, not legal.”); Vieth 
v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“No substantive definition 
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when evidence shows that voters were invidiously targeted for disfavored 
treatment.404 Voters may not have “any constitutional entitlement to electoral 
success” or any constitutional right to be placed in any particular election district, 
“but they should have a constitutional expectation against the government 
purposefully burdening their representational interests based on their partisan 
affiliation and beliefs.”405 
Rucho was correct to observe that the Elections Clause empowers Congress to 
conduct its own redistricting or even to set its own substantive standards of “fairness” 
in congressional redistricting.406 Rucho was also correct to observe that state 
legislators—like federal legislators—are free to decide among “different visions of 
fairness” when redistricting, such as drawing competitive districts, drawing districts 
that allocate seats by vote share, or drawing districts that adhere to traditional 
districting criteria.407 The choice among these priorities and theories of 
representation pose “basic questions that are political, not legal.”408 
But the issue before the Court in Rucho was not whether the challenged districts 
were fair according to any statutory standard imposed by Congress pursuant to the 
Elections Clause; the issue was whether targeting certain voters for partisan vote 
dilution violates the First Amendment or Equal Protection Clause.  
Rucho deflects attention from this core constitutional question by pretending it 
has been answered by precedent.409 The Court then redirects the reader’s attention to 
a discretionary question, writing that the “central problem” posed by the case is 
“determining when political gerrymandering has gone too far”410 and answering that 
 
 
of fairness in districting seems to command general assent.”). 
 404. See Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (“When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult 
for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member 
of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have 
obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish standing. The ‘injury in fact’ in an 
equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the 
imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”). 
 405. Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against Government 
Partisanship, 116 MICH. L. REV. 351, 383 (2017); see also Justin Levitt, Intent Is Enough: 
Invidious Partisanship in Redistricting, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1993 (2018); Michael 
Parsons, Clearing the Political Thicket: Why Political Gerrymandering for Partisan 
Advantage Is Unconstitutional, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1107 (2016) [hereinafter 
Parsons, Partisan Advantage]. 
 406. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508. 
 407. See id. at 2500. 
 408. Id.; accord Parsons, Partisan Advantage, supra note 405, at 1138–47 (distinguishing 
between legitimate and nondiscriminatory theories of representation—such as 
competitiveness, proportionality, etc.—and the illegitimate, discriminatory goal of partisan 
advantage). 
 409. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497–98 (“The ‘central problem’ is not determining whether 
a jurisdiction has engaged in partisan gerrymandering.” (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 
267, 296 (2004) (plurality opinion))). 
 410. Id. at 2497 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 296). 
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question is only possible “after determining how to define fairness.”411 That is          
not true.  
A legislative decision to adhere to traditional criteria, for example, is a political 
decision, and one that raises a wide range of additional choices: Which traditional 
criteria does the legislature wish to adhere to? Compactness? Contiguity? Political 
subdivision lines? Notable geographic features? How does the legislature wish to 
prioritize or balance these criteria? 
Even prioritizing traditional criteria, however, does not require or preclude taking 
partisan implications into effect. Legislators might adhere to traditional criteria 
without considering the partisan implications of doing so; legislators might adhere 
to traditional criteria in ways that enhance political competitiveness; or legislators 
might adhere to traditional criteria in ways likely to produce a delegation that reflects 
statewide voting strength. All of these reflect neutral, nondiscriminatory “visions of 
fairness”—and the choice among them is rightly deemed “political,” not “legal.” If, 
however, legislators adhere to traditional criteria in ways that are intended to 
suppress the influence of partisan opponents, then a constitutional question enters 
the picture.412 
Thus, holding partisan vote dilution unconstitutional does not impose a singular 
“vision[] of fairness” upon legislators.413 There may be billions of maps that reflect 
thousands of different priority rankings among dozens of different theories of fair 
representation.414 A world in which legislators can choose among billions of options 
is hardly a world in which the Court has “countermand[ed] the Framers’ decision to 
entrust districting [decisions] to political entities.”415 The Rucho plaintiffs presented 
a method for measuring vote dilution based on whatever theory of fairness a state 
legislature (or even Congress) preferred416—this left only a single question: does 
partisan vote dilution violate the Equal Protection Clause, First Amendment, or any 
other constitutional provision?417 The answer to that question involved no more than 
 
 
 411. Id. at 2497, 2501. 
 412. Cf. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 799 (2017) 
(“Traditional redistricting principles . . . are numerous and malleable. . . . By deploying those 
factors in various combinations and permutations, a State could construct a plethora of 
potential maps that look consistent with traditional, race-neutral principles. . . . For these 
reasons, a conflict or inconsistency between the enacted plan and traditional redistricting 
criteria is not a threshold requirement or a mandatory precondition in order for a challenger to 
establish a claim of racial gerrymandering.”); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 298 (“[P]acking and cracking, 
whether intentional or no, are quite consistent with adherence to compactness and respect for 
political subdivision lines.” (emphasis added)). 
 413. Contra Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500. 
 414. See Cho & Liu, supra note 402, at 360. 
 415. Contra Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497. 
 416. See id. at 2520–21 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing how the outlier method uses a 
State’s own criteria of fairness—save for partisan advantage—as a baseline for measuring 
dilution). 
 417. The Court unanimously held in Gill v. Whitford that vote dilution could constitute a 
cognizable constitutional harm. See 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018). The question before the 
Court in Rucho was whether the intentional infliction of this harm violated the Equal 
Protection Clause, First Amendment, or any other constitutional provision—a merits question 
involving constitutional interpretation. See 139 S. Ct. at 2514–15 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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routine constitutional interpretation—a judicial task the Elections Clause cannot 
preclude. 
IV. JUDICIAL POWER AND POLITICAL INTERPRETATION 
The modern political question doctrine carves out special categories of 
constitutional law for interpretative “self-monitoring” by the political branches.418 
These categories include cases arising under the Guarantee Clause, impeachment 
cases, certain cases relating to foreign affairs, 419 and now political-gerrymandering 
cases. Unlike the political remedies doctrine and the political finality doctrine, this 
interpretive strand has no history in the traditional political question cases and only 
emerges after Baker.420 And, as Part I discussed, this modern doctrine has 
increasingly embraced only the first two Baker factors: “textual allocation” and 
“judicial unmanageability.”421  
 In Rucho v. Common Cause, a majority of the Supreme Court held for the first 
time that it lacked jurisdiction over a case on the basis of a claim’s unmanageability 
alone.422 This new and unprecedented development does not go unnoticed in Justice 
Kagan’s dissent,423 but its gravity (and irony) does. For while the dissent debates the 
majority over whether political-gerrymandering claims are manageable,424 it fails to 
ask a predicate question: whether manageability can operate as a standalone test of 
jurisdiction. Declining jurisdiction in the face of a cognizable case or controversy 
stands in tension with the Court’s responsibilities under Article III,425 and it is not at 
all clear that the majority’s decision to refuse a claim based on manageability alone 
is reconcilable with its constitutional obligations under existing law. 
Rucho purports to define the circumstances under which the Court lacks 
interpretive authority over a case due to unmanageability (i.e., when a claim is not 
“resolvable according to legal principles”),426 but this “exception” to the Court’s 
constitutional duty to decide cognizable cases does not itself provide a manageable 
standard that operates “according to legal principles.” The majority’s ouroborian 
reasoning reveals as much about the inanity of the modern political question doctrine 
 
 
 418. Henkin, supra note 184, at 599; see also Seidman, supra note 39, at 448–58. 
 419. See Seidman, supra note 39, at 455–56. 
 420. Grove, supra note 3, at 1911–13. 
 421. See supra text accompanying notes 51–57. 
 422. 139 S. Ct. at 2509, 2515 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 423. Id. 
 424. Compare id. at 2502 (majority opinion) (“Appellees and the dissent propose a number 
of ‘tests’ for evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims, but none meets the need for a limited 
and precise standard that is judicially discernible and manageable.”), with id. at 2516 (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (“But in throwing up its hands, the majority misses something under its nose: 
What it says can’t be done has been done. Over the past several years, federal courts across 
the country . . . have largely converged on a standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering 
claims . . . .”). 
 425. See Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 194 (2012); Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., 
Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 274 (2008); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). 
 426. See 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (emphasis in original). 
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as it does about the unexpected simplicity of resolving political-gerrymandering 
claims.  
A. The Political Interpretation Doctrine?  
(Conflicting Constitutional Authority to Interpret the Constitution) 
If there is a “political remedies doctrine” to guide judicial remedial authority and 
a “political finality doctrine” to meter judicial decisional authority, could there also 
be a “political interpretation doctrine” to regulate judicial interpretive authority? 
Perhaps. But it would look nothing like the modern political question doctrine. Under 
the modern doctrine, the judicial branch takes almost exclusive control over all 
aspects of the interpretive power (legal and political) and then carves out categorical 
jurisdictional exceptions to that absolute power. 
1. Principled (Non)Deference and Construction: 
The Duty “to Say What the Law Is” 
The traditional political question cases involved substantive nonjusticiability, 
allocating the most practical and discretionary aspects of decision-making to political 
actors within the context of cases over which courts retained jurisdiction and ultimate 
adjudicative authority.427 Following this approach allows the federal courts to retain 
absolute control over the core exercise of their power while extending principled 
deference to political actors with respect to peripheral (but still legitimate) exercises 
of the judicial power. 
Under the political remedies doctrine, for example, the most pragmatic remedial 
design questions would go to the political branches, but courts would still decide 
constitutional sufficiency.428 Under the political finality doctrine, issues arising 
within cases that are more appropriately resolved by the political branches would go 
to the relevant actors, but courts would still decide constitutional cases on the 
merits.429  
 To track this logic, a political interpretation doctrine would have to be both 
shallower (nonjurisdictional) and wider (noncategorical). It would also need to retain 
control over core interpretive functions and extend greater deference to political 
actors over the more inherently practical and normative aspects of the judiciary’s 
interpretive powers, such as the construction of constitutional doctrine.430  
The judge-made gloss of constitutional doctrine—the great body of constitutional 
law—stands separate and apart from the Constitution itself.431 As Professor Louis 
 
 
 427. See supra Sections II.C, III.B. These cannot—and should not—be understood as fixed 
conceptual categories with firm boundaries between the legal and practical in any of these 
contexts: remedial, decisional, or interpretive. They are all contestable and dependent on 
power, legitimacy, and whether coordinate actors appear to be operating in good faith.  
 428. See supra Section II.C. 
 429. See supra Section III.B. 
 430. See Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics, supra note 209, at 662–63; Seidman, 
supra note 39, at 469–70. 
 431. See Seidman, supra note 39, at 469 nn.116–19 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 66 (1996); Henry P. 
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Michael Seidman and other scholars observe, the Constitution’s powerful and 
majestic commands—due process, equal protection, freedom of speech—are “too 
porous and general to be instantiated in everyday life.”432 The construction of 
constitutional doctrine converts the “legal abstractions” of the Constitution into “the 
kind of directives necessary to run the vast bureaucracy that is the United States.”433 
To do so, “the Justices must necessarily be concerned with extraconstitutional issues 
like administrability, coherence, and comprehensibility.”434 And—by definition—
the source of these values, the balance struck, and the ultimate form of the rule 
imposed cannot be the Constitution.435 
Any kind of political interpretation doctrine—one that would provide principled 
deference and greater space for political actors to play a role in shaping constitutional 
doctrine at the margins—would invite numerous inquiries beyond the scope of this 
Article.436 To question the reach and meaning of the Court’s doctrinal-construction 
power would qualify and complicate Marbury’s forceful declaration that “[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the            
law is.”437  
Suffice to say, the Supreme Court has shown little interest in doing such 
qualifying or complicating of the extent of its power to construct binding 
constitutional doctrine.438 Rather than any kind of principled deference, the Court has 
largely adopted a stance of principled nondeference, claiming exclusive control over 
constitutional construction almost without exception. 
One need not challenge the virtually unqualified reach of the Court’s law-
declaration power, however, to see how its unwavering commitment to that power 
creates tension between the modern doctrine’s categorical approach to jurisdiction 
and the rest of the Court’s Article III jurisprudence. Because there is no clean 
constitutional dividing line between the political and legal aspects of doctrine 
 
 
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); Akhil Reed 
Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000); David A. 
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 894 (1996)).  
 432. Seidman, supra note 39, at 470. 
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. 
 435. See id. (“If the Constitution were self-implementing we would not need the doctrine; 
because it is not self-implementing, judges must look outside the Constitution for the tools 
that will implement it.”). 
 436. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999) (examining and addressing the numerous questions that would arise from popular 
constitutionalism and shared interpretive authority). 
 437. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
 438. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (holding 
unconstitutional an attempt by Congress to legislatively overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512–16, 536 (1997) (holding 
unconstitutional an attempt by Congress to legislatively reimpose the compelling interest test 
for free-exercise claims after the Court abandoned the approach in Employment Division v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). 
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construction,439 manageability cannot offer any principled basis for drawing an 
exception to the Court’s default obligation to “say what the law is.”440 
2. Unprincipled Abdication and Manageability: 
“This Is Not Law” 
 As soon as the Court strays from making jurisdictional decisions based on 
whether the Constitution itself entrusts decisional authority over an individual case 
to the judiciary,441 it subverts core judicial functions required by Article III 
(interpreting how the Constitution applies in individual constitutional cases, deciding 
those cases on the merits, and providing remedies)442 to extraconstitutional 
considerations. There is not and cannot be a principled manageability exception to 
the Court’s interpretive or constructive supremacy. 
 This is what makes the central holding of the Rucho decision (the supposed 
unmanageability of crafting judicially enforceable standards) both hollow and 
hypocritical. Elevating manageability to be a standalone test of jurisdiction offers no 
reasoned basis for determining when to cast off the Court’s interpretive duties. 
First, the concept of manageability has no constitutional content; it is pure, 
unbridled discretion. Chief Justice Roberts emphasizes in Rucho that “‘judicial 
action must be governed by standard, by rule,’ and must be ‘principled, rational, and 
based upon reasoned distinctions’ found in the Constitution or laws.”443 
Unfortunately, he misses the irony of his decision: if “judicial action must be 
governed by standard,” then how does one define “manageability” and decide based 




 439. See Seidman, supra note 39, at 469–72. 
 440. Cf. id. at 444–65 (observing the inherently unprincipled nature of drawing categorical 
exceptions to jurisdiction under the modern political question doctrine). 
 441. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 3, cls. 6–7. 
 442. See Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 194 (2012); Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., 
Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 274 (2007); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). 
 443. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019) (alteration in original) 
(emphasis in original) (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278–79 (2004) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 444.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2487. One might say, “tradition.” Id. at 2487, 2493–95 
(“[F]ederal courts can address only questions ‘historically viewed as capable of resolution 
through the judicial process’” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968))); Vieth, 541 
U.S. at 278 (“‘The judicial Power’ created by Article III . . . is the power to act in the manner 
traditional for English and American courts.”); see also Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 203–04 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278). But “tradition” does not solve the 
riddle.  
 If the “traditional” manner just means “by standard, by rule,” see Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278, 
then the response is circular. In Vieth, for example, Justice Scalia asserts that “to act in the 
manner traditional for English and American courts” is to pronounce law that “must be 
principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.” Id. This makes manageability the 
defining characteristic of tradition, not tradition the defining trait of manageability.  
 If the “traditional” manner means that federal courts will only resolve the kinds of cases 
that came before “the courts of Westminster,” see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
1346 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:1295 
 
Manageability cannot be reduced to anything more than a constantly shifting 
bundle of practical considerations445 because manageability is, itself, a concern of 
constitutional construction. Simply put, “any constitutional provision can be supplied 
with working standards of interpretation.”446 One need only examine “the litany of 
case law either interpreting the broad language of the due process or equal protection 
clauses or establishing standards on which to invoke the first amendment right of 
free speech” to recognize “the disingenuousness of the ‘absence-of-standards’ 
rationale.”447 The Court has held that “excessive” punitive damages can violate due 
process (despite providing mere “guideposts” for ascertaining excessiveness),448 and 
the Court has recognized that probable cause—for all its central importance to 
criminal law—is “a fluid concept . . . not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat 
set of legal rules.”449  
Even standing “cannot be defined so as to make [its] application . . . a mechanical 
exercise.”450 Yet, this “absence of precise definitions . . . hardly leaves courts at 
sea.”451 Doctrinal rules and standards have always developed through discrete 
decisions over time, and the Court has constructed innumerable legal tests to 
operationalize vague and general constitutional commands. It is implausible to 
suggest that partisan gerrymandering is uniquely immune to judicial standards. 
Indeed, the Rucho majority’s feigned incompetence—its purported inability to 
craft a standard—was particularly striking given that numerous federal district courts 
had all converged on the same standard for partisan gerrymandering claims in the 
 
 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), then the response cannot 
account for the different conception of—and allocation of—authority found in our own 
constitutional government. See supra text accompanying notes 76–89. As discussed above, 
the role of the federal courts in the school desegregation cases cannot be reconciled with a 
strictly colonial-era view of the judicial power. See supra text accompanying notes 76–89.  
Nor can such an approach account for the one-person, one-vote doctrine; constitutional racial 
vote dilution doctrine; or racial sorting doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 384–387. 
If “manageability” limits federal courts to the kinds of cases that came before English courts, 
then a great deal of constitutional doctrine would be “unconstitutional” and much of the 
Constitution itself would be a dead letter. 
If, however, the “traditional” manner simply means limiting courts to resolving genuine 
disputes, then “manageability” offers nothing that standing doctrine does not already provide 
and partisan vote dilution claims would be “of a Judiciary Nature,” contrary to the holding in 
Rucho. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 
332, 342 (2006)); supra Section III.A. 
 445. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1275 (2006) [hereinafter Fallon, Judicial Manageability] (“[I]f the 
requirement of judicial manageability applied to the Court’s own decisionmaking process[,] 
 . . . the criteria by which the Court identifies judicially unmanageable standards might 
themselves be disqualified as judicially unmanageable.”). 
 446. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 
1031, 1047 (1985). 
 447. Id. at 1046 (citing Scharpf, supra note 48, 556–57). 
 448. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–85 (1996). 
 449. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). 
 450. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 451. Id. 
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years leading up to the decision.452 As Justice Kagan points out in her dissent: “[w]hat 
[the majority] says can’t be done has been done.”453 The decisions pending before 
the Court last term all used a similar three-part test (intent, effect, and causation) to 
identify the kind of vote-dilution harm the Court had unanimously deemed a 
cognizable constitutional injury in Gill just the term before.454 The three-part test in 
Rucho provided an “utterly ordinary” doctrinal standard—“the sort of thing courts 
work with every day.”455 Perhaps the Rucho majority found that standard 
unacceptable for practical reasons, but that brings us to our next problem.  
Second, making manageability a standalone test of jurisdiction opens a rift in the 
responsibilities imposed by Article III. Assume for a moment that interpreting the 
Constitution to render judgment within the context of specific cognizable cases is the 
core of the judicial interpretive function, elaborating broad doctrinal standards within 
which legislatures can operate is a generally accepted aspect of that function, and 
spelling out detailed and sharp administrative rules is the most practical and political 
aspect of the interpretive function.456 If so, “manageability” instructs the Court to 
place the exercise of its most constitutionally contestable interpretive power before 
the discharge of its core constitutional duty. It places the judge’s practical preference 
for a sweeping or sharp rule above the judge’s constitutional obligation to render a 
reasoned ruling.457  
Rucho offers a prime example. The majority obsesses over the question of how 
much partisan gerrymandering is too much,458 contending that all the proffered tests 
and standards fail the political question doctrine’s manageability test.459 According 
to Chief Justice Roberts, any legal standard that cannot offer an indisputable answer 
to this question is not a “principled” or “rational” standard at all.460 Confronted with 
Justice Kagan’s objection that “there are other instances in law where matters of 
degree are left to the courts,” Chief Justice Roberts responds that judges in such cases 
“began with a significant body of law about what constituted a legal violation.”461 
But where does the Chief Justice think that “significant body of law” came from?  
 
 
 452. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2516 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 453. Id. 
 454. See id. at 2514–15. 
 455. Id. at 2516–17. 
 456. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
 457. To be sure, there are good reasons for an apex court like the Supreme Court to 
articulate clear constitutional rules, and the benefits of doing so provided part of the 
justification for Congress granting the Supreme Court the power of discretionary review 
through its certiorari process. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical 
Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 44–59 (2009) [hereinafter Grove, Vertical Maximalism]. 
The question here, however, is whether the Court’s difficulty in crafting an easily 
administrable rule can override the Court’s constitutional duty to render a reasoned decision 
at all. 
 458. See, e.g., Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006)). 
 459. See id. at 2502. 
 460. See id. at 2507 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 461. Id. at 2505–06. 
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Reasoned decision-making in individual cases is the core judicial function and the 
way legal principles develop over time.462 The absence of a clear rule does not signify 
the absence of reasoned decision-making, let alone the absence of principled 
standards. In response to the majority’s interminable hand-wringing over “how much 
is too much,” Justice Kagan offers an answer: “This much is too much.”463 Justice 
Kagan’s commitment to resolve the case at hand is arguably more consistent with 
the commands of Article III than Chief Justice Roberts’s choice to forgo resolving 
the case because he was not satisfied with the political palatability of the standards 
on offer.464 
None of this is to deny the important (and inevitable) role that prudential 
considerations play in all exercises of judicial power, whether they be interpretive, 
decisional, or remedial. “[N]o society . . . can fail in time to explode if it is deprived 
of the arts of compromise, if it knows no ways to muddle through.”465 But there are 
opportunities for courts to meter their involvement at every stage of the judicial 
process,466 and the act of constitutional interpretation is no different.  
One cannot extract practical judgments and extraconstitutional values from the 
process of constructing doctrine. To borrow a phrase from Justice Scalia’s opinion 
in Vieth, manageability turns out to be “root-and-branch” a matter of judicial 
interpretation.467 And while practical virtues like administrability, clarity, and 
predictability will inevitably shape the standards and rules that judges develop in the 
process of deciding a case, there is no principled constitutional basis for allowing 
these goals to eclipse the obligation to decide constitutional cases otherwise properly 
before the judicial department. 
B. Answering Rucho’s Questions 
Viewing Rucho in this light reveals what has roiled the Court since the beginning. 
Political gerrymandering does not present a hard question of constitutional 
interpretation; it presents an easy question of constitutional construction.  
The Justices never lacked the ability to articulate a standard for partisan-
gerrymandering claims.468 Their debate was over the practical merits and political 
 
 
 462. See Scharpf, supra note 48, at 555–56 (“I am at a loss to see how either the Common 
Law or American constitutional law could have grown and flourished if the courts had been 
unable or unwilling to perform the creative functions which [the judicial-unmanageability 
argument] so categorically disavows for them.”). 
 463. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2521 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 464. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (“[W]e 
cannot shirk [our] responsibilit[ies] merely because our decision may have significant political 
overtones.”).  
 465. Bickel, supra note 44, at 49. 
 466. See supra Sections II.C, III.B. 
 467. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 468. See id. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Quite obviously, . . . several standards for 
identifying impermissible partisan influence are available to judges who have the will to 
enforce them. . . . What is clear is that it is not the unavailability of judicially manageable 
standards that drives today’s decision. It is, instead, a failure of judicial will . . . .”). 
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risks of any standard they announced.469 By focusing on these questions—and setting 
out certain doctrinal preconditions over time—the Court lost sight of its primary 
obligation: interpreting what the Constitution commands.  
1. The Interpretation Question:  
Does Partisan Vote Dilution Violate the Constitution? 
In Rucho, the Justices argued over a number of issues, but one question of 
constitutional meaning was at the core of the case: does partisan vote dilution violate 
the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, or Article I of the Constitution?470  
Despite the central importance of this constitutional question, Chief Justice 
Roberts skips right over it. Rather than analyzing and deciding whether it is 
unconstitutional for state actors to dilute an individual’s vote for partisan advantage, 
the Chief Justice simply assumes it is constitutional, at least to some extent.471 The 
entire opinion starts from this premise and can be distilled down to four moves:  
 
(1) “[A] jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering.’”472 
 
(2) Thus, “[t]he ‘central problem’ is not determining whether a jurisdiction has 
engaged in partisan gerrymandering. It is ‘determining when political 
gerrymandering has gone too far.’”473  
 
(3) “[I]t is only after determining how to define fairness that you can even begin 
to answer the determinative question: ‘How much is too much?’”474  
 
(4) “Deciding among . . . different visions of fairness . . . poses basic questions 
that are political, not legal.”475 
 
 By starting with a conclusion about constitutional meaning, Chief Justice Roberts 
avoids the act of judicial interpretation almost entirely and instead backs himself into 
a question about political discretion.476 Where does this critical assumption—that 
some partisan vote dilution is constitutional—come from? The answer is unclear in 
Rucho (and, perhaps, was unclear even to Chief Justice Roberts), but it points us 
toward the hidden barycenter of the partisan-gerrymandering debate: the practical 
and political concerns about constitutional doctrine that warp the Court’s legal 
inquiry into constitutional meaning. 
For partisan-gerrymandering claims, two concepts are locked in orbit. The Court 
assumes that some partisan gerrymandering must be constitutional (as a matter of 
 
 
 469. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 470. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019). 
 471. See id. at 2497. 
 472. Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)). 
 473. Id. (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 296). 
 474. Id. at 2501. 
 475. Id. at 2500. 
 476. See supra text accompanying notes 398–417 (discussing how the choice among 
competing legitimate and nondiscriminatory theories of representation is a political decision). 
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meaning) because of the practical consequences of any standard that would render 
all partisan gerrymandering unlawful (as a matter of doctrine).477 Standards are then 
deemed “impossible” to craft (as a matter of doctrine) because none can possibly 
identify “how much is too much” (as a matter of meaning).  
In other words, the difficult question about constitutional meaning (how much 
intentional partisan dilution creates a violation?) only exists because Justice Scalia 
created it based on an unjustified and unsupported assumption about constitutional 
meaning (that some intentional partisan dilution does not create a violation).478 That 
assumption is based solely on practical and political preconditions that the Court has 
put in place for the kind of standards they would be willing to impose.479 And these 
doctrinal preconditions are what preclude the Justices from ever honestly asking (or 
even entertaining)480 the primary interpretive question: is partisan vote dilution 
unconstitutional?  
Rucho instead railroads this critical and profound question of constitutional law 
and holds—for the first time and without any support, reasoning, or justification—
that the government possesses the explicit power to suppress the electoral influence 
of those who hold political views disfavored by the party in power.481 This allows 
the majority to skirt ever analyzing whether partisan vote dilution violates a 
constitutional right and instead to shift immediately to analyzing what degree of 
partisan vote dilution violates a constitutional right, a pivot used to undermine each 
doctrinal option offered.482 
Chief Justice Roberts does feign briefly toward precedent, pretending that the 
primary interpretive question before the Court has already been answered.483 But this 
is an empty rhetorical gesture for two reasons. 
First, none of the case law Chief Justice Roberts cites actually establishes that 
partisan advantage is a legitimate state interest in its own right.484 Each decision 
 
 
 477. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 478. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 296. 
 479. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 480. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2497 (2019) (“Partisan 
gerrymandering claims have proved . . . difficult to adjudicate. The basic reason is that . . . ‘a 
jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering.’”) (quoting Hunt v. 
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)); id. at 2517 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]rue enough that 
even the naked purpose to gain partisan advantage may not rise to the level of constitutional 
notice when it is not the driving force in mapmaking or when the intended gain is slight.”). 
 481. See Parsons, Partisan Advantage, supra note 405, at 1138–47 (explaining how the 
Court’s prior precedents only support political considerations in redistricting, not the pursuit 
of partisan advantage). It is, perhaps, not surprising that such a corrosive and authoritarian 
principle of constitutional law would make its first appearance in a way that is not explained, 
justified, or reasoned—but simply assumed into existence. One can only hope it remains 
confined to redistricting law. 
 482. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502–03 (discussing how question of degree undermines 
equal protection claim); id. at 2504–05 (discussing how question of degree undermines First 
Amendment claim); id. at 2505–06 (discussing how question of degree undermines outlier 
method). But see id. at 2506 (ignoring arguments posed and declining to analyze claim 
altogether by recasting Elections Clause claim as a Guarantee Clause claim). 
 483. See id. at 2497–98. 
 484. See Parsons, Partisan Advantage, supra note 405, at 1138–47.  
2020] GERRYMANDERING & JUSTICIABILITY  1351 
 
simply acknowledges that political classifications and political concerns are 
permissible in redistricting.485 For example, legislators may use political information 
to craft competitive districts or to draw districts that mirror statewide political voting 
strength.486 The cases cited by Chief Justice Roberts are consistent with the variety 
of neutral, nondiscriminatory, legitimate theories of representation discussed 
above.487 None of those cases, however, answer whether intentional partisan vote 
suppression is lawful or legitimate,488 as Chief Justice Roberts (mis)represents.  
Second, and more importantly, it would not matter even if prior dicta did support 
what the Chief Justice suggests. The core question before the Rucho Court was 
 
 
 485. See id. at 1138–44.  
 486. See id. at 1139–43. 
 487. See supra text accompanying notes 398–415. 
 488. The Court employs a particularly well-rehearsed trope from the political-
gerrymandering debate when it conflates general partisanship with a specific intent to dilute 
voting power on a partisan basis:  
Unlike partisan gerrymandering claims, a racial gerrymandering claim does not 
ask for a fair share of political power and influence, with all the justiciability 
conundrums that entails. It asks instead for the elimination of a racial 
classification. A partisan gerrymandering claim cannot ask for the elimination of 
partisanship. 
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2502 (2019). This passage contains so much 
misdirection in so few sentences it is hard to imagine it could have been written in good faith.  
 First, racial dilution claims (as opposed to racial sorting claims) do protect a “fair share” of 
power in the same way a partisan dilution claim would: prohibiting intentional dilution for an 
invidious and discriminatory purpose. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982); 
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980). The Court long ago reasoned its way out of 
the paper bag of “proportional representation.” See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–66 
(1973). “Rather than looking to proportional electoral outcomes, the Court looked to whether 
[a] scheme interfered with equal electoral opportunities.” Parsons, Partisan Advantage, supra 
note 405, at 1115. This allowed the Court to identify racial vote dilution without interpreting 
the Constitution to guarantee racial proportionality. Rucho is written as though this entire body 
of constitutional law does not exist. See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Erasure of Racial Vote 
Dilution Doctrine, ELECTION L. BLOG (June 28, 2019, 10:18 AM), http://electionlawblog.org 
/?p=105855 [https://perma.cc/9A9N-7F2Y].  
 Second, racial sorting claims do not ask for the elimination of all racial considerations in 
redistricting—just those that are not justified (e.g., used to confer racial advantage rather than 
prevent racial dilution). See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 798 
(2017).  
  Third, a partisan-gerrymandering claim does not ask for the elimination of partisanship any 
more than racial gerrymandering claims ask for the elimination of racism. Instead, partisan-
gerrymandering claims ask for the elimination of, or some restriction on, either (a) intentional 
partisan vote dilution (akin to racial vote dilution claims) and/or (b) the elimination of an 
unjustified partisan classification, such as partisan classification for partisan advantage (akin 
to racial sorting claims). See Parsons, Partisan Advantage, supra note 405, at 1150–59.  
 General “partisanship” is easily distinguishable from a specific intent to burden, suppress, 
or disfavor citizens under law based on their partisan preferences. General partisanship 
involves a pitched battle to appeal to (or change) voters’ political preferences. Partisan dilution 
involves an effort to insulate legislators from voters’ political preferences. See G. Michael 
Parsons, The Institutional Case for Partisan Gerrymandering Claims, 2017 CARDOZO L. REV. 
DE NOVO 155, 164 (2017) [hereinafter Parsons, The Institutional Case]. 
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whether partisan vote dilution violates the First Amendment, the Equal Protection 
Clause, or Article I. The “reasoning” of the majority opinion rests from top to bottom 
upon an assumption that begs that very question.489  
The majority was not precluded from answering the constitutional question 
because standards were unmanageable; standards were unmanageable because the 
majority chose not to answer the constitutional question.490 The entirety of the Rucho 
opinion places the doctrinal cart before the interpretive horse.491  
All in all, Rucho represents a tragically missed opportunity. Had the Court 
engaged the interpretive question forthrightly, it might have been surprised to find 
the answer quite easy. 
Does vote dilution inflict cognizable individual harm? Yes, as Gill unanimously 
held.492 Do state actors violate the Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment 
if they inflict that harm based on political viewpoint for the purpose of suppressing 
the influence of those who hold views disfavored by the state? The weight of the 
doctrine would suggest a clear answer to this constitutional question as well: yes.493  
With that definitive constitutional right established, the Court could have then 
moved to the “central question” of constitutional construction posed by partisan-
gerrymandering claims: “how far is too far?”  
2. The Construction Question: 
What Is the Standard to State a Claim of Partisan Vote Dilution? 
When courts design doctrine, they necessarily import practical considerations and 
are constrained by institutional factors such as the workability of standards for 
liability and enforcement.494 There is nothing uncommon about courts under- or 
over-enforcing constitutional rights in the process of constructing administrable 
constitutional law.495  
A bright-line rule might encourage administrability but cause otherwise-
actionable claims to fail.496 Or a bright-line rule might help prevent violations but 
 
 
 489. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Dirty Thinking About Law and 
Democracy in Rucho v. Common Cause, 3 AM. CONST. SOC’Y SUP. CT. REV. 293, 302 (2019) 
[hereinafter Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, Dirty Thinking About Law and Democracy]. 
 490. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 491. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 492. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018). 
 493. See generally Kang, supra note 405, Levitt, supra note 405, and Parsons, Partisan 
Advantage, supra note 405. Even the state defendants before the Court the prior term conceded 
that a statute expressly seeking partisan advantage would be unconstitutional. See Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 26–27, Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161) [hereinafter Transcript of 
Oral Argument, Gill]; Transcript of Oral Argument at 45–47, Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 
1942 (2018) (No. 17-333).  
 494. See Fallon, Judicial Manageability, supra note 445, at 1299; Lawrence Gene Sager, 
Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1212, 1221 (1978). 
 495. Fallon, Judicial Manageability, supra note 445, at 1278; see Barry Friedman, When 
Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735,                      
738–40 (1992). 
 496. See Fallon, Judicial Manageability, supra note 445, at 1298–1306. 
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prohibit otherwise-legitimate state conduct in the process.497 In both cases, the 
Court’s decision to adopt bright-line doctrine could be subject to critique for 
effectively constricting the meaning of the right in one instance and functionally 
usurping legislative or executive authority in the other.  
Yet, whatever position one takes on the appropriate limits of constitutional 
construction (if any), there is no inherent reason for the Court to behave any 
differently when formulating a workable partisan-gerrymandering standard. Once 
one accepts that a “manageable” standard does not need to track constitutional 
meaning precisely,498 the decision to adopt a rough standard or a sharp rule can stand 
on its own bottom. The Court need only provide reasoned justifications. 
A bright line might help guide mapmakers, avoid frequent conflict between courts 
and legislatures, and ensure judicial impartiality in appearance and in fact. A broad 
standard might capture more violations, give legislators more room for negotiation 
and compromise, and have more common-sense appeal to “the intelligent man on the 
street.”499 These justifications can be animated by countervailing constitutional 
principles, prudential concerns, or basic administrability. In every constitutional case 
it decides, the Court picks among a countless range of virtues, values, and priorities, 
baking whatever it chooses into constitutional doctrine. Only when confronted with 
political-gerrymandering claims does the Court stare back blankly and ask, “but 
what’s the recipe?”  
The Court tried and failed to produce a standard for partisan gerrymandering over 
the course of half a century not because the question of constitutional interpretation 
was hard but because the question of constitutional construction was easy. Too easy. 
If the question was “how far is too far?,” the answer was “well, how far do you 
want?” The Court faced what Professor Seidman has called “the brute and 
frightening reality of unmediated and uncontrollable choice.”500 With thousands of 
local, state, and federal legislators across the political spectrum suddenly standing in 
the kitchen, the Rucho majority blinked. Better to not cook at all than show everyone 
how the doctrinal sausage is made. 
Partisan-gerrymandering claims terrify the majority, not because they pose an 
extraordinary question of constitutional complexity, but because they pose an 
ordinary question of constitutional construction with extraordinary consequences. 
Such claims are not unmanageable in any inherent, theoretical, or constitutional 
sense. They have become unmanageable because the Court has made several 
extraconstitutional policy demands over time that allegedly must be met—
preconditions before the Court is willing to do its constitutional duty.501 This has 
 
 
 497. See id. 
 498. See Fallon, Judicial Manageability, supra note 445, at 1283 (“[T]he Justices 
participating in Vieth all appeared to assume that a judicially manageable standard—if one 
could be devised—need not replicate the Constitution’s meaning precisely.”). 
 499. Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill, supra note 493, at 37.  
 500. Seidman, supra note 39, at 472. 
 501. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Intervention as 
Judicial Restraint, 132 HARV. L. REV. 236, 240 (2018) [hereinafter Charles & Fuentes-
Rohwer, Judicial Intervention as Judicial Restraint] (describing the Court’s “reluctance to 
intervene [as] a function of the Court’s institutional calculus that it ought to protect its stature 
and institutional capital,” and explaining that “the debate over standing, jurisdiction, and 
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resulted in an unusually rigorous (and ad hoc) threshold for finding a standard 
“manageable” that the Court applies to partisan-gerrymandering claims alone.  
To be acceptable, a partisan-gerrymandering standard must be clearly rooted in a 
principled interpretation,502 provide common-sense appeal,503 result in infrequent 
application,504 offer a bright-line administrable rule to avoid judicial entanglement,505 
and avoid relying upon any particular notion of fairness.506 And, before any of this, 
comes the Court’s reputation.507  
 
 
judicially manageable standards is a red herring”). 
 502. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004) (noting that a standard must be 
“judicially discernible in the sense of being relevant to some constitutional violation”); id. at 
295 (“This Court may not willy-nilly apply standards—even manageable standards—having 
no relation to constitutional harms.”); id. at 312 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing 
hypothetical statute expressly burdening “Party X” and noting that “we would surely conclude 
the Constitution had been violated”); Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill, supra note 493, at 
20–21 (“JUSTICE KAGAN: . . . [T]here are plenty areas of law . . . where we look at intent 
beyond the face of a statute.”). 
 503. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill, supra note 493, at 37 (“CHIEF JUSTICE 
ROBERTS: . . . [T]he intelligent man on the street is going to say [that an efficiency gap 
threshold for determining constitutionality is] a bunch of baloney. . . . [and believe that] the 
Supreme Court prefer[s] [one party] over [another].”). 
 504. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2498 (2019) (“In considering whether 
partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable, we are mindful of Justice Kennedy’s counsel 
in Vieth: Any standard for resolving such claims must be grounded in a ‘limited and precise 
rationale’ . . . .” (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306–08 (Kennedy, J., concurring))); id. at 2515–
16 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[J]udges should not be striking down maps left, right, and center, 
on the view that every smidgen of politics is a smidgen too much. Respect for state legislative 
processes—and restraint in the exercise of judicial authority—counsels intervention in only 
egregious cases.”). 
 505. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2498 (“An expansive standard requiring ‘the correction of all 
election district lines drawn for partisan reasons would commit federal and state courts to 
unprecedented intervention in the American political process.’” (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 
306 (Kennedy, J., concurring))); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1490 (2017) (Alito, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing the “danger . . . that the federal courts will be 
transformed into weapons of political warfare”); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 300–01 (“[T]he vaguer the 
test for availability, the more frequently interest rather than necessity will produce litigation.”). 
 506. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500 (“Deciding among . . . different visions of fairness . . . 
poses basic questions that are political, not legal.”); Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1933 (rejecting 
asymmetry as a measure of “the effect that a gerrymander has on the fortunes of political 
parties” rather than a measure of “the effect that a gerrymander has on the votes of particular 
citizens”); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288 (rejecting proportional representation as a constitutional 
principle). 
 507. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 301 (“Is the regular insertion of the judiciary into districting, 
with the delay and uncertainty that brings to the political process and the partisan enmity it 
brings upon the courts, worth the benefit to be achieved—an accelerated (by some unknown 
degree) effectuation of the majority will? We think not.”); Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill, 
supra note 493, at 36–38 (“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: . . . [T]he main problem for me [is 
that these claims are] . . .  going to cause very serious harm to the status and integrity of the 
decisions of this Court in the eyes of the country.”). 
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Any one (or handful) of these goals could provide a reasoned basis for adopting 
one standard over another.508 Instead, they are cobbled together as a collective excuse 
for inaction. Allowing the Court to place its doctrinal preferences above its judicial 
obligations in this manner is irreconcilable with the rest of the Court’s Article III 
jurisprudence and its fundamental conception of judicial supremacy and judicial 
review.509 
As Justice Stevens lamented in Vieth, “it is not the unavailability of judicially 
manageable standards” that drove the decision in Rucho but, rather, “a failure of 
judicial will.”510 A number of paths were available to the Rucho Court, any one of 
which would have been more legally principled and more consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional doctrines and practices than the unbridled and 
standardless path taken in Rucho. 
a. Purposeful Incrementalism 
One path would have been to intervene in an incrementalist fashion, address the 
cases before the Court with narrow opinions, and leave more concrete boundary 
drawing for another day.511 The Supreme Court has long held that, when faced with 
“perplexing questions,” the usual course is for judges “to confine [themselves] to 
deciding only what is necessary to the disposition of the immediate case.”512 
For this approach, the Court could have held that the Constitution at least provides 
redress when plaintiffs can prove “predominant intent” and “durable” effect.513 This 
 
 
 508. See, e.g., Fallon, Judicial Manageability, supra note 445, at 1289–90. 
 509. See supra Sections III.B., IV.A; cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 126–27 (1986) 
(“[F]ocus[ing] on the perceived need for judicial review and on the potential practical 
problems with allowing such review . . . in assessing justiciability would alter substantially 
the analysis the Court enunciated in Baker v. Carr . . . .”). 
 Perhaps one could argue that declining jurisdiction under the modern doctrine is simply the 
furthest point at the end of a spectrum of underenforcement. See, e.g., Fallon, Judicial 
Manageability, supra note 445, at 1306–09. If the vast majority of constitutional construction 
is already extraconstitutional, then complete and unfettered jurisdictional discretion seems like 
an unavoidable extension of the Court’s broader unprincipled, prudential flexibility.  
 Needless to say, this is not the position staked out by Chief Justice Roberts. Rucho—like 
almost all of the Court’s modern justiciability doctrine—purports to be grounded in the 
Constitution. Once one steps back from the theoretical to navigate the Court’s existing second-
best principles and doctrines, Rucho simply fails on its own terms.  
 Moreover, there are good reasons to treat absolute nonenforcement based on a jurisdictional 
interpretation differently than partial underenforcement based on a substantive interpretation. 
First, unlike a completely theoretical “right” that is not enforced for jurisdictional reasons, a 
“right” that occasionally has some real-world effect can at least be said to exist in some 
tangible sense, even if that right lacks its conceptually maximal bite for substantive reasons. 
Second, requiring the court to modulate its interpretations on the merits rather than meter its 
intervention altogether arguably serves a broader rule-of-law function. 
 510. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
 511. See Tushnet, supra note 57, at 1233 (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: 
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 5, 9–14 (1999)). 
 512. Whitehouse v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 349 U.S. 366, 372–73 (1955). 
 513. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2502–04 (2019). 
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would have vindicated the harms in the discrete cases before the Court and allowed 
a standard to start forming without consensus about how far judicial intervention 
should ultimately go. And by saying this far is “too far,” the Court could have started 
developing a “significant body of law” in its traditional stepwise fashion.514 
From a doctrinal perspective, such a standard (temporary or not) could have 
encompassed multiple constitutional meanings. Perhaps only extreme 
gerrymandering violates the Constitution. Or perhaps any meaningful amount of 
intentional dilution violates the Constitution, but the relevant standard should only 
reach egregious cases to give legislators breathing room and prevent judicial 
entanglement.515 The Court need not choose between enforcing a right to its “full 
conceptual limits”516 or denying that the right exists at all,517 especially from the 
outset. Suppressive intent does not need to be blessed as constitutionally legitimate 
to avoid every trace sign of partisan intent becoming constitutionally actionable.518 
From an institutional perspective, starting with such a deferential standard and 
signaling a willingness to work inward incrementally would have allowed actors on 
all sides to self-regulate in response to unfolding events. State legislators, seeing the 
potential for more aggressive judicial action on the horizon, might have curtailed 
their most flagrant abuses.519 The Court meanwhile would have left open the 
possibility of more stringent standards (or applications) as necessary without 
precommitting to them. 
Instead, Chief Justice Roberts acts as if all doctrinal questions must be answered 
in one fell swoop—that the Court must provide, in Rucho, a rule clear enough to 
resolve all gerrymandering cases for all time.  
This is not consistent with the normal judicial mode, let alone a precondition for 
judicial power. In reflecting on the virtues of an incrementalist approach, Chief 
Justice Roberts might have considered the constitutional guidance of then-Circuit 
 
 
 514. Id. at 2506. 
 515. See id. at 2515–16 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[J]udges should not be striking down 
maps left, right, and center, on the view that every smidgen of politics is a smidgen                    
too much.”). 
 516. See Fallon, Judicial Manageability, supra note 445, at 1299. 
 517. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2505 (expressing concerns that “a First Amendment claim, 
if it were sustained, would render unlawful all consideration of political affiliation in 
districting” (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. 267, 294 (2004)) (emphasis in original)).  
 518. See, e.g., id. at 2517 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (rejecting that “state officials’ intent to 
entrench their party in power is perfectly ‘permissible’”); id. at 2516 (stating that “[r]espect 
for state legislative processes—and restraint in the exercise of judicial authority—counsels 
intervention in only egregious cases”). 
 519. As Professor Rick Pildes has pointed out, the internal logic of legal doctrine is not 
“the only sourc[e] of stability and precision in law”—if political actors “face the proper 
incentives, constitutional constraints can become self-enforcing.” Richard H. Pildes, 
Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 66 
(2004). For example, after the Supreme Court introduced the notoriously ambiguous Shaw 
claim, “[S]tate legislators and other actors internalized the vague legal constraints of Shaw in 
ways that generated a stable equilibrium.” Id. at 68. Ironically, the most enduring source of 
instability and litigation with respect to Shaw claims over time was the lack of a partisan-
gerrymandering claim to offset the incentives for boundary testing that remained.  
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Judge Roberts: “[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide 
more . . . .”520 
b. Principled Clarity 
Another path would have entailed a more assertive judicial intervention: enforcing 
First Amendment and equal-protection principles to their full conceptual limit by 
making any degree of intentional partisan vote dilution actionable. On this point, the 
Rucho Court was unanimous: no one was willing to endorse such a rigorous 
standard.521  
Although no Justice endorsed such a firm, principled standard, it is not without 
practical or institutional benefits. One benefit stands above all others: clarity. As 
Justice Scalia once noted, “[g]ood fences make good neighbors.”522 If legislators 
were told clearly and forcefully that they could not target citizens for suppression 
based on their political beliefs, they would have a plain sense of what the law permits 
and forbids. Such clear tests also do a better job of guiding lower courts.523 
A principled clarity approach also has the benefit of common sense. The 
“intelligent man on the street” may think it “a bunch of baloney” for the Court to 
proclaim that a map is unconstitutional when it crosses some arbitrary numerical 
threshold for measuring a map’s partisan asymmetry,524 but that same person will 
surely understand if the Court proclaims that the Constitution forbids the government 
from discriminating between citizens based on how they vote. The constitutional 
gravity of this axiom is obvious, and one does not need a law degree to understand 
that the general partisanship involved in persuading voters is different from the illicit 
partisanship involved in suppressing voters.525 
To be sure, applying basic free-speech and equal-protection principles to partisan-
gerrymandering claims could have spurred a wave of litigation at first. The Court’s 
own failure to apply these principles over the past half century encouraged unlawful 
practices to accumulate, and clearing a backlog of statutes codifying invidious 
behavior could take time.526  
 
 
 520. PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. D.E.A., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., 
concurring). 
 521. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2498 (“An expansive standard requiring ‘the correction of all 
election district lines drawn for partisan reasons would commit federal and state courts to 
unprecedented intervention in the American political process.’”) (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 
306 (Kennedy, J., concurring)); id. at 2515–16 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[J]udges should not 
be striking down maps left, right, and center, on the view that every smidgen of politics is a 
smidgen too much. Respect for state legislative processes . . . counsels intervention in only 
egregious cases.”). 
 522. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995). 
 523. See Grove, Vertical Maximalism, supra note 457, at 10–11, 44–45. 
 524. Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill, supra note 493, at 37. 
 525. See Levitt, supra note 405, at 2009–18; Parsons, The Institutional Case, supra note 
488, at 160–65.  
 526. Of course, if the Court had acted in Rucho, any potential “wave of litigation” might 
have been largely overtaken and obviated by the 2020 census. With every map in the United 
States being revisited to ensure one-person, one-vote compliance, state and local officials 
could have incorporated the Court’s partisan-gerrymandering compliance as well. See Parsons, 
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Nonetheless, the most important long-term institutional question “is not how 
many maps are challenged when the rule of law is announced, but how many maps 
are challenged once the rule of law is settled.”527 The Court’s decisions occur at a 
single point in time, but institutional actors throughout our democratic system react 
and adjust to one another over the long run.  
Consider, for example, “how ‘justiciable’ would First-Amendment issues appear 
today if the process of interpretation and application had been halted in 1912?”528 
Introducing “strict scrutiny” after a century-long free-for-all of viewpoint 
suppression would have had a profound impact. The specter of large-scale, 
aggressive judicial intervention might have resulted in a lesser standard being 
adopted—or a stronger standard only being adopted over time. But the consequences 
of constitutional compliance would hardly have justified declining to interpret or 
apply the First Amendment at all.  
c. Practical Clarity 
Finally, the Court could have paired a firm commitment to constitutional 
principles with a clear, predictable, and neutral administrable rule for legislators and 
lower courts by employing a burden-shifting standard. 
In its one-person, one-vote jurisprudence, the Court uses a ten percent total-
population deviation threshold to determine whether the burden of challenging or 
defending a state legislative map rests with the plaintiff or with the government.529 
This ten percent trigger has been so successful in encouraging mapmakers to steer 
clear of litigation it is easy to forget that the Court’s actual standard of constitutional 
liability remains far more amorphous: whether a state has “sacrificed substantial 
equality to justifiable deviations.”530 
In one-person, one-vote cases, the Court recognizes that legislatures should have 
the freedom to pursue a wide range of legitimate redistricting policies but that (1) 
these policies cannot be applied in a discriminatory fashion531 and (2) these policies, 
“however rational, cannot constitutionally be permitted to emasculate the goal of 
substantial equality.”532 As the Supreme Court has stated: 
Neither courts nor legislatures are furnished any specialized calipers that 
enable them to extract from the general language of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the mathematical formula that 
establishes what range of percentage deviations is permissible . . . . While 
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[a sixteen-odd percent population deviation] may well approach tolerable 
limits, we do not believe it . . . sacrifice[s] substantial equality . . . .533 
The Supreme Court has never definitively answered “how far is too far” under its 
one-person, one-vote doctrine, but that does not make its decisions in individual vote-
dilution cases “unreasoned” or its overall vote-dilution doctrine “unmanageable.”  
By pairing a flexible-but-principled liability standard with a clear-but-qualified 
presumptive rule, the Court has reaped the benefits of both. The burden-shifting 
standard provides administrable guidance to legislators and courts, giving 
mapmakers a method to avoid litigation. And yet, the burden-shifting standard also 
resists the gamesmanship that might result from a safe harbor.534 The principled 
liability standard, on the other hand, provides a commonsense and celebrated 
constitutional doctrine that aligns with popular notions of fair play. 
The Court could employ a similar approach to partisan gerrymandering, offering 
a forceful declaration of constitutional principles and then adopting a burden-shifting 
standard (from the outset or over time) to help streamline litigation and guide 
mapmakers, judges, and voters. This would provide a practical rule to address the 
Court’s construction concerns and a constitutional standard to fulfill its interpretation 
concerns. 
One tool in particular provided the Rucho Court an opportunity to meet all of these 
needs: the outlier method.535 The approach identifies whether the challenged district 
constitutes an extreme statistical outlier by using computing technology to randomly 
generate a universe of maps that incorporate the state’s physical and political 
geography and the legislature’s declared districting criteria and priorities (excluding, 
of course, partisan advantage).536 This universe of nonpartisan maps (numbering in 
the thousands, millions, or even billions) provides a distribution of electoral 
outcomes one would expect from a nonpartisan redistricting process.537 One then 
simply compares the challenged district to the range of outcomes one would expect 
in the plaintiff’s district to determine whether the challenged district constitutes an 
“extreme outlier.”538 
Chief Justice Roberts offers only two objections to the outlier method, neither of 
which survive even the briefest encounter with the Court’s one-person, one-vote 
jurisprudence.  
Before addressing these two objections, however, it’s worth highlighting two 
arguments Chief Justice Roberts does not make about the outlier method. Chief 
Justice Roberts does not claim that the outlier method constitutionalizes proportional 
 
 
 533. Id. at 329. 
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representation (despite claiming earlier in the opinion that “[p]artisan 
gerrymandering claims invariably sound in a desire for proportional 
representation”).539 He does not because he cannot. Massachusetts, as Justice Kagan 
points out, regularly elects an all-Democratic congressional delegation despite 
roughly thirty-five percent of voters regularly casting ballots for Republicans.540 Yet, 
because those voters are evenly spread across the state, an outlier analysis reveals 
that “no valid districting plan whatsoever [would] have even a single Republican-
favoring district.”541 That is not due to partisan gerrymandering; it’s due to the 
political geography of the state. In other words, it is not true that “[p]artisan 
gerrymandering claims rest on an instinct that groups with a certain level of political 
support should enjoy a commensurate level of political power and influence.”542 The 
very case before the Court demonstrated that conclusively. 
Nor does Chief Justice Roberts allege that the outlier method imposes a particular 
“vision[] of fairness” upon politicians,543 depriving them of their legitimate 
discretionary, legislative authority in redistricting. The outlier method uses 
legislators’ own chosen discretionary criteria—their own “vision of fairness”—as its 
baseline for measuring the impact of partisan vote dilution.544  
Over the first twenty-six pages of the majority opinion, these two supposed 
“flaws” are deemed so intrinsic to partisan-gerrymandering claims—all partisan-
gerrymandering claims—that the whole category can be written off as forevermore 
irredeemable and nonjusticiable.545 On page twenty-seven, the entire foundation of 
that nonjusticiability opinion is revealed as demonstrably false.546  
Rather than recognizing that its abstract musings about political-gerrymandering 
claims are not tethered to the actual case before it—let alone any potential future 
cases—the majority pivots to two new objections, specially tailored to the outlier 
method. 
First, Chief Justice Roberts contends that it is “indeterminate and arbitrary” to use 
a state’s own redistricting criteria as a baseline because “different criteria could move 
the median map toward different partisan distributions.”547 Thus, “the same map 
could be constitutional or not depending solely on what the mapmakers said they set 
out to do.”548 
But the same is true of the one-person, one-vote doctrine. Legislatures are free to 
advance any number of legitimate state redistricting policies that might result in some 
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degree of quantitative vote dilution so long as those policies “are free from any taint 
of arbitrariness or discrimination.”549 Under this standard, “the same map could be 
constitutional or not depending solely on what the mapmakers said they set out to 
do.”550 
Consider a state legislative map with a twelve percent total population deviation. 
In one scenario, the state’s criteria claim to prioritize compactness, but the plaintiffs 
come forth with thousands of alternative maps that do a better job maximizing 
compactness with less population deviation. The map is unconstitutional. In another 
scenario, the state’s criteria claim to prioritize keeping counties whole and, in fact, 
no alternative maps do a better job of keeping counties whole while keeping 
population deviations to twelve percent or less. The exact same map is now 
constitutional based “solely on what the mapmakers said they set out to do.”551 
Second, Chief Justice Roberts objects to using the outlier method for measuring 
dilution because “it would return us to ‘the original unanswerable question (How 
much political motivation and effect is too much?).’”552 Chief Justice Roberts floats 
several options to prove his point: “Would twenty percent away from the median 
map be okay? Forty percent? Sixty percent? Why or why not?”553  
The answer is simpler than it sounds. If the question were “how much deviation 
from the median map violates the Constitution,” then adopting a random, strict cutoff 
might be troubling.554 But, if the question is “how much deviation from the median 
map presumptively violates the Constitution,” then selecting any one of these 
thresholds is no more problematic for partisan-gerrymandering claims than selecting 
a ten percent threshold is for one-person, one-vote claims.  
This distinction—between a principled and ambiguous liability standard and a 
practical and administrable presumptive rule—also complicates Rucho’s attempt to 
distinguish one-person, one-vote claims from partisan-gerrymandering claims on the 
basis that “the one-person, one-vote rule is relatively easy to administer as a matter 
of math.”555 Nothing could be further from the truth.  
If Chief Justice Roberts means to say that the ideal of equal treatment is easily 
identifiable under the one-person, one-vote doctrine (any map with zero percent 
deviation), then so is the ideal of equal treatment in the partisan-gerrymandering 
context (any map that produces outcomes consistent with the median map). If Chief 
Justice Roberts means to say that the one-person, one-vote rule is easily 
administrable because it provides a clear mathematical cutoff for presumptive 
constitutionality (ten percent), then a clear mathematical cutoff for presumptive 
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If, however, Chief Justice Roberts means that the ultimate standard of liability for 
the one-person, one-vote doctrine is clear, then he is sorely mistaken. Determining 
“how far is too far” before constitutional liability kicks in under the one-person, one-
vote standard involves the same kind of complex, contextual, fact-dependent, and 
indeterminate weighing of individual burdens and state interests that has vexed the 
Court with respect to partisan-gerrymandering standards. Once beyond the ten 
percent burden-shifting threshold, it’s entirely unclear what population deviation 
“goes too far.” Twenty percent? Thirty percent? Why or why not? The answer 
depends on the unique facts of the case and whether the legislature’s legitimate 
policies have “sacrificed” or “emasculate[d]” the goal of “substantial equality.”556  
 The goal of “substantial equality” under the one-person, one-vote doctrine is no 
more unmanageable than the goal of avoiding “substantial dilution” under a partisan-
gerrymandering claim. And the Rucho opinion offers no principled, reasoned, or 
constitutional basis for holding otherwise.  
CONCLUSION 
Rucho v. Common Cause will not stand the test of time. Its contradictions and 
flawed reasoning are too plain;557 its constitutional tensions too deep,558 and its 
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implications for democracy too dire.559 Whatever the political question doctrine may 
mean, the Rucho Court did not seem interested in resolving the legal question before 
it “according to legal principles.”560  
Perhaps the Chief Justice thought denying jurisdiction would help the Supreme 
Court “stay above the fray.”561 But the Court is “in the fray” whether it recognizes 
partisan-gerrymandering claims or not.562 And the Court’s inaction is not without 
consequence. 
Even if one gives Chief Justice Roberts the benefit of the doubt and assumes that 
Rucho was written in good faith, the opinion’s manageability holding would still 
appear doctrinally incoherent, historically aberrant, constitutionally questionable, 
popularly indecipherable, and intellectually dishonest. But this is not even the worst 
case for the Court. Many are unlikely to give the majority the benefit of the doubt, if 
they read the opinion at all. And without any presumption of good faith to protect it, 
the outcome in Rucho reeks of raw partisanship and institutional self-interest. In an 
era when Republican appointees hold increasing control over judicial decision-
making and Republican legislators have entrenched themselves in more states than 
Democratic legislators, the “intelligent man on the street” might understandably call 
“baloney” when he hears that partisan gerrymandering violates the Constitution but 
that the Court has split down party lines over whether to do anything about it. This 
is not an outcome that seems legitimate to a layperson—or even most lawyers. 
If the Court is worried about constitutional fidelity, popular legitimacy, and the 
principled exercise of judicial power, then doubling down on the modern political 
question doctrine is not the answer. Whether Rucho was written in good or bad faith 
is beside the point if it cannot be taken seriously on its own terms.563 The boundary 
between the branches is forever shifting and contestable, and the judiciary relies upon 
public trust to maintain its authority.564 
When elections—the institution designed to resolve political conflicts—no longer 
fulfill their primary function due to partisan manipulation, we should not be surprised 
when that conflict moves to the courts. When the courts slam their doors shut along 
partisan lines as well, it is not difficult to imagine where political conflict goes next. 
Support for democratic institutions has been declining precipitously in recent 
years,565 and the Court does not advance institutional legitimacy and stability by 
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foreclosing all avenues of democratic accountability (let alone by dismissively 
waving them away as “an instinct”).566 
Adopting a more historically, analytically, and precedentially sound approach to 
the political question doctrine would have made the answers to the Court’s self-
inflicted manageability conundrum clear. Judicial standards under the Equal 
Protection Clause and the First Amendment are “well developed and familiar,” and 
federal courts are more than capable of determining, “if on the particular facts they 
must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious 
action.”567 Gerrymandering for partisan advantage fits the bill.  
When the state targets voters who hold disfavored political beliefs for electoral 
suppression, the controversy should be “lift[ed] . . . out of the so-called ‘political’ 
arena and into the conventional sphere of constitutional litigation.”568 The Supreme 
Court’s duty is then to interpret the Constitution, decide the cognizable case before 
it, and remedy the violation through the most appropriate equitable means available. 
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